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1.1  Introduction and Summary 
Over their work life, most workers will desire to change jobs occasionally 
and to vary their amount of work. Impediments to these changes could reduce 
lifetime productivity by  preventing the worker from moving to the most pro- 
ductive job, and they could reduce welfare by  causing a worker to work too 
much or too little. Older workers approaching retirement, in particular, often 
desire job mobility because a job that was chosen for its characteristics during 
most of the working life may not be well suited to workers later in life. Further- 
more, older workers often want to reduce hours of  work to make a gradual 
transition into retirement. They face not only the same impediments to changes 
in job and hours as younger workers, but additional impediments due to the 
structure of pension plans, the provisions of the Social Security system, and 
their need for health care insurance. 
Some rigidities are part of normal business practice, arising from production 
technologies. For example, team production requires that most  workers be 
present in the workplace at the same time. Other rigidities may be holdovers 
from a time when most of the working population was young and wanted full- 
time, year-round jobs, when most retired late in life and life expectancy was 
short so that the length of retirement was  short. Still other rigidities may be 
due to public policy, for example, the Social Security laws; while some may 
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serve legitimate social goals, others may not because the laws have not been 
changed to keep up with changing circumstances. 
The objective of this paper is to examine some evidence about rigidities in 
the labor market, and particularly how rigidities affect the labor market experi- 
ence of  older workers by  causing impediments to change. It discusses some 
of the causes of the rigidities, and points in the direction of how the situation 
for older workers might be improved. It is, however, beyond the scope of the 
paper to offer remedies: the labor market is exceptionally complicated, and 
experience has shown that uninformed interference in the labor market can be 
counterproductive. 
1.1.1  Labor Market Rigidities 
Labor market rigidities are employment practices and work-related financial 
arrangements that constrain or influence the volume of work with respect to 
hours per day, days per week, or weeks per year. Rigidities include the inability 
to change hours, days, or weeks on a given job, and impediments to changing 
to a job that offers the desired combination of hours, days, and weeks. Rigidi- 
ties also include situations in which the volume of work can be varied, but the 
change requires a disproportionate sacrifice in compensation,  job satisfaction, 
mental or physical requirements, or location. 
Different jobs may offer different mixes of compensation (as between, say, 
pension accumulation and money income), but this would not necessarily be a 
rigidity as long as total compensation is the same. Total compensation may 
change with age if the change reflects changes in productivity, and, again, this 
would not be a rigidity. 
Understanding rigidities is important from the point of view of the individ- 
ual because of the costs associated with rigidities. From a theoretical point of 
view, people will want to stop working when they have accumulated enough 
resources to finance the rest of their lifetime consumption. But withdrawal 
from the labor force will be gradual. Both leisure and consumption are valued 
(produce utility), and as tastes shift with age toward leisure, the desired amount 
of work will slowly fall. Furthermore, an individual operates in an uncertain 
environment with respect to health status, life expectancy, rates of  return on 
investments, inflation, and so forth: because the uncertainty is resolved gradu- 
ally, change will be gradual. 
In a simplified situation where the wage rate is fixed and there are no rigidi- 
ties, a fall in the desire to work will produce a fall in the volume of work (for 
simplicity, hours of work). If hours cannot be varied, the optimal constrained 
choice will be to work more than is desired for several years, and then not to 
work at all. The constrained choice entails a loss of welfare, both in the years 
surrounding retirement and in  later years because the level of  economic re- 
sources is not optimal. 
These welfare effects are based on the simple choice between labor and 
leisure, but many older workers have other important reasons for wanting part- 13  The Effect of Labor Market Rigidities on Older Workers 
time work. For example, many have very old parents whose need for attention 
and care is not compatible with a full-time job. The constrained choices are 
not to work at all, which may not be economically feasible, or to work full- 
time and allow public support systems to care for the parents. 
The aggregate effects on individuals affect society. Early retirement influ- 
ences the national saving rate because on average the retired dissave whereas 
workers save. Ceteris paribus, early retirement is associated with lower re- 
sources during the retirement years, so that the poverty rates of the elderly will 
be higher, affecting needs-based programs for the elderly. To the extent that 
early retirement means that aggregate earnings fall, the tax base is reduced by 
early retirement. 
I.  1.2  Summary of Findings 
Most workers of  all ages face rigidities that arise from fixed employment 
costs and the requirements of team production. Fixed employment costs must 
be covered by  a substantial number of  hours of  work. Therefore, part-time 
work will tend to have low  money wages because a greater fraction of the 
work time will have to cover fixed employment costs. Team production tends 
to concentrate work hours and penalizes those who want to work irregular 
hours or work part-time. These rigidities imply that an older worker cannot 
easily reduce hours on the career job, so a job change is required. 
Older workers have additional impediments to job change arising from nor- 
mal business practice. If they change jobs to reduce hours, they lose their job- 
specific skills. Because they will be expected to stay on a new job for fewer 
years than a younger worker, an employer will be reluctant to invest in job 
training. A new job with fewer hours will have to be a job that requires few 
job-specific skills and that is compatible with high turnover. A better-educated, 
higher-skilled, older worker will be competing for a new job with a young, 
less-educated, lower-skilled worker. These factors make it highly likely that 
the new job will be low paying. 
Older workers face impediments that are partly the effect of policy toward 
retirement. Social Security has incentives that influence work choices, but the 
incentives will gradually decline over the next decade because of changes in 
the Social Security law. The Social Security earnings test seems to affect work 
decisions, but it has little obvious social benefit. Defined pension plans can 
reduce job mobility. The requirements of an older worker for health care insur- 
ance may prevent job change, particularly if a worker has a preexisting condi- 
tion. There is only scattered evidence of labor market discrimination against 
older workers. The effects of these impediments are difficult to quantify, but 
they probably are considerably  less important than the effects due to fixed costs 
and team production. 
Because the costs of job change late in the work life are so high, the main 
effort to reduce labor market rigidities should be toward changes in employ- 
ment conditions on the career job. This would involve training and job restruc- 14  Michael D. Hurd 
turing to allow hours flexibility. However, any changes must be advantageous 
both to employers and employees: otherwise, older workers will be viewed as 
a liability, and employers will be reluctant to hire them. Determining whether 
these kinds of changes can be accommodated within the requirements of team 
production and the constraints of fixed costs is far from easy. 
1.2  Evidence about Labor Market Rigidities 
The objective of this section is to examine the pattern of labor market activ- 
ity before retirement and the hours of  work of  younger workers to see what 
evidence they give about labor market rigidities. The idea is that, given the 
wage rate, if  hours of  work can be freely chosen, we would expect to find 
considerable variation in hours of work of an individual as he or she ages, and 
considerable dispersion in hours across individuals. 
1.2.1  Retirement Behavior 
As workers age, tastes for work gradually change, making work less desir- 
able. Declining tastes might be caused by  gradual changes that make work 
more unpleasant or by  changes in health status that make work increasingly 
burdensome. Within any time period this would change the desired ratio of 
work time to leisure time. An individual, anticipating this change, would plan 
a lifetime in which work effort in a time period would gradually decline with 
age, eventually falling to complete leisure, or retirement. This can be repre- 
sented by a gradual shift in the labor supply function of the worker. If the wage 
rate facing the individual is fixed so that hours of work may be freely chosen, 
the change in tastes causes work hours to decline gradually. A gradual decline 
in productivity with age simply accelerates the rate of  change: if  the fall in 
productivity leads to a fall in the wage rate, hours of work will fall continu- 
ously as long as hours can be freely chosen. 
I have made no distinction between hours per day, days per week, weeks per 
month, or months per year: a worker would probably want to reduce along all 
dimensions but probably at different rates. Because little research has been 
done to understand all these dimensions, I will speak of hours of work with 
the understanding that the changes could be along all dimensions. 
Labor force participation by  age in cross-section data does decline slowly 
in accordance with this description. Figure 1.1 shows average labor force par- 
ticipation rates of men and women by  single years of age as measured in the 
Current Population Survey (CPS). The rates are the average of  1988 and 1989. 
Although the figure is consistent with a gradual decline in work effort of all 
individuals, leading to different individuals withdrawing completely at differ- 
ent ages, it is also consistent with each individual withdrawing suddenly at 
different ages without any intervening fall in hours. 
Table 1.1 shows how full-time work among the employed changes with age 
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Source: Author’s calculations from 1988 and 1989 Current Population Survey participation rates 
by  single years of  age. 
Labor force participation rates 
Table 1.1  Percentage of the Employed Who Are Full-Time Workers 
Age  1968  1974  1980  1987 
55-59  82.4  82.1  81.5  80.5 
60-62  80.9  79.2  76.3  74.4 
63-65  74.3  71.6  68.9  66.9 
66-70  57.0  51.5  40.8  44.5 
71 +  43.2  39.5  36.0  34.9 
All  75.5  74.2  71.7  70.6 
Source: Sum and Fogg (1990). based on the Current Population Survey. 
tent with the idea of gradual withdrawal from the labor force: for example, in 
1987, 80.5% of 55-59-year-old  workers worked full-time, yet just 34.9% of 
workers 71 or older worked full-time. The table also shows a time trend over 
all ages to less full-time work. The trend is particularly strong among older 
workers. Yet, because the entries are percentages of workers, the trend cannot 16  Michael D. Hurd 
Table 1.2  Percentage of Persons Not Working or Working Fifty-one or Fifty- 
two Weeks,  1986 
Age  55-59  60-62  63-65  66-70  71+ 
Percentage  84.0  83.9  86.6  89.4  96.0 
Source: Sum and Fogg (1990). based on Current Population Survey. 
be used to verify a gradual withdrawal from the labor force: complete with- 
drawal of full-time workers and a more gradual withdrawal of part-time work- 
ers would produce the same age pattern of full-time work. 
Table 1.2 shows that at any time the great majority of the older population 
works either full-time or not at all. Thus, only a fraction of the age-55-or-over 
population works part-time, and the fraction falls with age. The implication is 
that, as the labor force participation rate decreases, most workers move from 
full-time employment to not working at all. 
Although it is not directly relevant for this argument, I note that over time 
the percentage of the 55-or-over population working part-time has fallen from 
14.1% in 1967 to 10.8% in 1986 (Sum and Fogg 1990), probably owing to the 
overall decline in participation. 
Any employment or participation rates that are based on cross-section data 
will not show the change in labor force status as an individual ages, which is 
what  we  need to understand labor market rigidities. Such change requires 
panel data. Using the 1969-79  Retirement History Survey (RHS), a panel data 
set of two-year periodicity, Rust (1990) estimated that, at a minimum, 75% of 
men age 58-64  in  1969 moved directly from full-time work to completely 
retired with no intervening part-time work. The exact percentage depends on 
the method of classifying work as to full-time or part-time. For example, if the 
classification is based on annual hours of work, just 22% of employed men 
changed from full-time employment to part-time employment during the ten 
years of the survey. By the end of the survey the youngest men were 68, and 
the great majority had retired, so it is unlikely that the termination of the survey 
caused many transitions from full-time to part-time employment not to be re- 
corded. If the analysis is based on weekly hours, just 8% of employed men had 
a transition to part-time employment. Rust concludes that, although there are 
some transitions from full-time to part-time work, the great majority of men 
retire without any intervening transition. 
Similar results are found by others: Based on the RHS, Quinn, Burkhauser, 
and Myers (1990) estimated that, among men who leave their full-time career 
jobs, 73% leave the labor force completely, 15% move to part-time employ- 
ment, and 12% go on to further full-time employment.  A rough estimate would 
be that about 83% eventually leave full-time employment for complete retire- 
ment.] Berkovec and Stern (1991) estimate that in the National Longitudinal 
1. The calculation assumes that the fraction moving from any full-time job to part-time is .15, 
which is the fraction that move from a full-time career job to a part-time job. 17  The Effect of Labor Market Rigidities on Older Workers 
Table 1.3  Distribution of Workers by Hours of Work before Retirement (%) 
Age 
Hours Worked One Year 




14.8  15.3  17.6  57.6 
58.7  62.1  54.1  28.3 
26.5  22.6  28.3  14.1 
Source: Jondrow, Brechling, and Marcus (1987),  based on 1978 Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
Survey of Older Men (NLS) 67% changed directly from full-time work to com- 
pletely retired. Based on quarterly labor force status in the RHS, Blau (1994) 
found that just  12.6% of  men  initially observed to be  working full-time 
changed to part-time work at some during the ten years of the panel. Again, 
because the youngest was 68 by  the end of the survey, it is unlikely that the 
termination of the survey left many transitions unrecorded. 
Table 1.3 has the distribution of hours worked during the year prior to retire- 
ment in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).*  It shows that, at ages 
below 68, a large fraction of those who retired during the year were working 
full-time the preceding year; that is, the year before retirement was generally 
not a year of  reduced ho~rs.~  It also shows that at older ages some people do 
retire from part-time jobs, as would be expected from table 1.1, but the total 
number is small because most retire completely before the age of 68. 
I take these results to be good evidence that a large fraction of  men leave 
the labor force completely with no intervening period of part-time work. How- 
ever, these kinds of findings and this interpretation are not accepted by every- 
one. Ruhm (1989, 1990a, 1990b) used the RHS to conclude that most older 
workers have bridge jobs at some point before retirement, and that “fewer than 
two-fifths of household heads retire directly from career jobs” (Ruhm 1990a, 
482). He defines a bridge job as any job held after the career job, which he 
defines to be the longest job ever held. In my  view, however, many  bridge 
jobs as defined by Ruhm are different from jobs taken to accomplish gradual 
retirement: for example, 24% of the bridge jobs in Ruhm’s data were generated 
by workers leaving their career jobs before the age of 50. Almost all of these 
bridge jobs were held for more than ten years. This kind of job turnover is part 
of  the normal job mobility of  the working life, not of  the movement toward 
retirement. A more reasonable definition of a bridge job would be a job taken 
at an age approaching retirement and held for a few years before retirement. 
For example, define a bridge job to be a new job taken at age 55 or over follow- 
ing a change from a career  job, and held for one to four years before retirement. 
According to this definition just 14.4% of all workers in the RHS had bridge 
2. Retirement here is self-assessed, not based on observed behavior. It includes both men and 
3. The pattern is similar two years before retirement: the great majority were working full-time. 
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jobs.4 This is similar to the fraction who partially retire in Blau (1994) and in 
Rust (1990). 
Gustman and Steinmeier (1984), using the same data as Rust, find that about 
one-third of men partially retire at some time. The explanation of the differ- 
ence seems to be in the definitions. The authors I have discussed based their 
conclusions on observed behavior: hours worked or weeks worked. Gustman 
and  Steinmeier take retirement and partial retirement from a self-assessed 
question.5 People who say they are retired are often, in fact, working for pay 
and even working full-time. In that rigidities in the labor market refer to hours 
worked and wages received, I believe we should base our conclusions on be- 
havior, not self-assessed evaluations, which are subject to differing interpreta- 
tions. 
Although the argument at the beginning of  this section suggests that the 
prevalence of complete retirement from full-time work is due to aspects of the 
labor market that discourage part-time work, not to workers’ tastes, the argu- 
ment will be more convincing if  in jobs that have flexibility the change to 
retirement is more gradual. It is reasonable to suppose that the self-employed 
can more easily determine their hours of work, and, indeed, in the RHS hours 
of  work  by  the self-employed have more dispersion: among white married 
males, 24% of the self-employed worked less than two thousand hours per year 
compared with 11  % of wage and salary workers (Quinn 1980). Therefore, with 
increasing age the self-employed should stay in the labor force longer, and 
wage and salary workers should switch to self-employment so that they  can 
stay in the labor force at reduced hours. Both effects will cause the fraction of 
the workforce that is self-employed to increase with age. 
Table 1.4 gives the percentage self-employed at each age. The rising preva- 
lence of self-employment is consistent with the view that workers would like 
to reduce hours gradually and that most of  the abrupt withdrawal is due to 
labor market characteristics, not  to  workers’  tastes for  sudden retirement. 
However, cross-section data cannot  show  the relative  importance of  some 
workers switching from wage or salary jobs to self-employment and of  the 
self-employed retiring later. 
In panel data we find that both are important factors. In the RHS about 5% 
of  wage  and  salary workers  changed from wage  and  salary work  to  self- 
employment each year (Fuchs 1982). Most were from occupations similar to 
self-employed occupations: almost no blue-collar workers switched. Further- 
more, the self-employed work to greater ages, further increasing the fraction 
of workers who were self-employed.6 
Additional evidence that labor market characteristics are substantially re- 
sponsible for the abrupt withdrawal from work of most workers is that the self- 
4. My calculation based on table 2 in Ruhm 1990a. 
5. “Do you consider yourself to be retired or partially retired?’ 
6. Quinn (1980) in the RHS and Iams (1987) in the New Beneficiary Survey found similar pat- 
terns. 19  The Effect of Labor Market Rigidities on Older Workers 
Table 1.4  Percentage of Workers Self-Employed by Age, 1990 
55-59  60-64  65 + 
Men  13.1  15.8  24.0 
Women  8.0  9.1  13.3 
All  11.2  12.9  19.2 
Source: Employment and Earnings. January 199  1,  based on the Current Population Survey. 
Table 1.5  Transitions from Career Jobs (%) 
Wage and Salary 
Workers 
Women  Men  Self-Employed Men 
All 
Part-time on career job 
Part-time on new job 
Full-time on new job 
Out of labor force 
Total 
Age 65 or over 
Part-time on career job 
Part-time on new job 
Full-time on new job 
































Source: Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers (1990),  based on Retirement History Survey. 
Nore; Distribution of  self-employed women not reported. 
employed change from full-time work to part-time work more often than wage 
and salary workers do. Table 1.5 shows transitions of full-time workers from 
career jobs.’ Men and women who work for a wage or salary had quite similar 
patterns: they mainly left the labor force; just a small percentage moved to 
part-time on the same job. The transitions among the self-employed were very 
different: only 49% left the labor force completely; 25% reduced hours on the 
career job. At age 65 or over the differences are even greater: 44% of the self- 
employed men became part-time workers on their career job, compared with 
7-8%  of  wage and salary workers. If workers desire hours flexibility as they 
age and self-employment offers hours flexibility, this is to be expected. 
The conclusion is that retirement behavior provides convincing evidence of 
labor market rigidities: the great majority retire from full-time work with no 
intervening part-time work. This is not compatible with slowly changing tastes 
for work when hours can be freely chosen. 
7. Career  jobs are thirty-five hours or more per week on a job held for more than ten years. The 
sample is limited to those who could be followed for four or more years in the panel (Quinn, 
Burkhauser, and Myers 1990). 20  Michael D.  Hurd 
1.2.2 
Almost all male workers and many female workers work full-time: 94% of 
men and 79% of women aged 25-44  worked full-time in 1990.8  Full-time work 
tends to be full-year work: in the 1969 RHS 36% of men said they worked two 
thousand hours, almost all the rest worked more than two thousand hours, ex- 
cept for 19% who did not work at all. Economic theory and common sense say 
that it is not credible that almost all workers would freely choose similar hours 
per week and per year: variation in assets, wage rates, family circumstances, 
and tastes will cause variation in desired hours and, hence, in observed hours. 
An indicator of rigidities in the labor market is that flextime, the ability to 
choose the start and stop time of  the workday, is rare: in the  1985 CPS just 
12.3% of workers said they were on flextime (Mellor 1986). Even this fraction 
is probably an overstatement of the amount of flexibility, because in the ques- 
tionnaire the ability to vary hours by as little as thirty minutes was classified 
as flextime. Flextime varies by  industry and occupation: in blue-collar jobs 
only 6.5% had  flextime. Furthermore, the amount of  flexibility was  limited 
even among those with flextime because nearly all jobs required attendance at 
the place of employment during core times. 
Further evidence of inflexibility comes from surveys in which workers are 
asked directly if  they can vary hours of work. In the PSID 56% of those re- 
sponding to the question said they could not reduce hours of work (Gustman 
and Steinmeier 1985). In an early release of the Health and Retirement Survey 
(HRS), only 14% of  wage workers aged 55-61  said they were free both to 
increase and to decrease hours. 
Work Patterns and Job Flexibility at All Ages 
Productivity 
The discussion has been about flexibility in the choice of  hours of  work, 
but wage flexibility is an important aspect of a flexible labor market. If  the 
productivity of a worker or group of workers falls, yet employers are not free 
to reduce wages, employment practices will develop leading to job separation 
rather than income reduction. There is little direct evidence on wage flexibility 
at the individual level in response to individual productivity changes because 
there is little direct evidence on changes in productivity at the individual level: 
this would require panel data with measures of  productivity. There is some 
evidence about average changes in productivity with age in cross-section. 
The general finding is that on average productivity falls, but only marginally 
as workers age through their 50s and early 60s. The evidence is of three kinds: 
surveys of managers, opinions of experts, and studies of physical productivity. 
A typical survey result is reported in Rhine 1984: In a survey of  363 senior 
human resources administrators  (mostly vice presidents),  just 13% agreed with 
the statement that the performance of workers peaks at a young age. When 
8. Employment and Earnings, January  1991, based on the CPS. Full-time is thirty-five or more 
hours per week. 21  The Effect of Labor Market Rigidities on Older Workers 
asked about occupations where this happened, 60% of the 13% said the de- 
clines were in occupations that required physical exertion. This seems to be 
common: where there is a decline, it is when physical exertion is required. 
Paul (1983a) reports on three studies of the physical output of workers. Each 
of them shows little if any fall in output with age. McNaught and Barth (1992) 
analyzed data on physical output of  reservation operators for Days Inn of 
America: they found only small differences in the productivity of  older and 
younger workers. Jablonski, Kunze, and Rosenblum (1990) report on a number 
of  studies of  physical output, conducted by  the Bureau of  Labor Statistics. 
Examples of  typical findings are that the average output of  55-64-year-old 
males in the footwear industry was 93% of  the output of  35-44-year-olds. 
Among mail sorters output is basically flat until age 60 or over, when it is 96% 
of the output of average output. Among clerical workers only those aged 25 or 
less have productivity that is much below average: productivity does not fall 
with age. Jablonski, Kunze, and Rosenblum conclude that in these studies of 
physical output there is evidence for a modest decline in productivity with 
age. However, they make the important point that, even if average productivity 
declines with age, the variation within age groups in  productivity is much 
greater than the variation across age groups: that is, the productivity of many 
older workers will be greater than the productivity of many younger workers. 
Of course, physical productivity cannot be measured in most jobs, but state- 
ments by management confirm the findings about physical productivity. Paul 
(1983a) reports that, when supervisors rate the performance of workers com- 
pared with the requirements of the job, older workers do as well on average as 
younger workers. 
The general finding is well summarized as follows: “Because chronological 
age is not related to maintenance of  performance, older employees are not 
more costly to firms because of declining productivity. This is not to suggest, 
however, that certain older (as well as younger) individuals do not experience 
declining performance. This can and does occur and is very costly to organiza- 
tions” (U.S. Senate 1984, 63). 
A final example of productivity variation by  age comes from what practi- 
cally amounts to a controlled experiment. In the United Kingdom a new do-it- 
yourself store, one of a chain of stores, was staffed entirely by  workers aged 
50 or over (Hogarth and Barth 1991). By a number of human resource mea- 
sures such as labor turnover and absenteeism, it was the most successful store 
in a control group of similar stores owned by  the same chain. By other mea- 
sures such as sales per employee and wage costs, it was about average. The 
management of  the chain found the experiment a success and staffed other 
stores only with older workers. 
Interpreting this example requires some caution because the workers were 
undoubtedly not average in  the 50-or-over population: only the healthy and 
active wanted to work. That is, it is likely that the experiment compared pro- 
ductivity of an above-average group of older workers with an average group of 
younger workers. This difficulty is also found in the productivity studies dis- 22  Michael D.  Hurd 
cussed above: in cross-section data the composition of the labor force cannot 
be kept constant as age increases because the least productive (least healthy) 
will leave the sample of workers. This is alleviated but not eliminated in panel 
data: we observe the same individuals as they age, so we may be able to con- 
clude correctly that the productivity of the individuals who remain in the labor 
force does not fall. But, if workers whose productivity begins to fall leave the 
labor force, we may conclude, possibly incorrectly, that the productivity of the 
cohort does not fall with age. 
Wage Rates 
The variation  of  wage rates  with age has been  the subject of controversy 
because of the difficulties of measurement. In cross-section wage rates will not 
be  a good measure of  the wage  path  of  an individual, particularly  at older 
ages, because of changes in the composition of the workforce. For example, as 
unhealthy workers who have lower wage rates leave the labor force, the average 
wage of those remaining will tend to increase with age. Similarly, early retire- 
ment  of  the highly  paid  will  tend  to reduce the average  wage of  those re- 
maining. But even in the absence of such changes in composition, the averages 
can, at best, describe wage rates that include any job changes that may happen 
with age. Among the elderly particularly, wages fall with a job change because 
the change is typically from a full-time job to a part-time, less well paid job. 
Thus the average wage path in cross-section cannot be matched to the produc- 
tivity path of a worker who stays on the same job. These composition and job- 
change problems are reduced in panel data where we can follow the wage path 
of individuals and control for job change. 
Gustman and Steinmeier (1985) in the RHS investigated the effects of com- 
position  and job-change effects. They found that conventional  estimates that 
do not control for those effects “may overstate the decline with experience in 
wages for those working full time by as much as 60 per cent” (264). Jablonski, 
Kunze, and Rosenblum (I 990) make adjustments for composition effects and 
find slowly declining real wage rates. The conclusion is that wage rates proba- 
bly decline somewhat for those who remain on the main job, but the decline is 
modest. However, because the cost to the employer of fringe benefits rises with 
age, total compensation may well continue to increase with age.” Again, be- 
cause we only observe those who stay on the job, we cannot say with confi- 
dence that  the wages and compensation of  those who left would  have been 
roughly constant had they stayed. 
This somewhat limited evidence suggests that, among workers who remain 
on their  main job, productivity and total  compensation change with  age at 
about  the same rate.  Even  so, the productivity  of  some individuals surely 
changes markedly with age because of changes in health status, failure to up- 
9. I have seen no studies that make corrections for composition and job change in studying the 
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grade skills, and attitudinal changes. What was  a good match between the 
worker and the firm at a younger age becomes a worse match at older ages. 
This change could be accommodated if wages could be reduced at the individ- 
ual level in line with the productivity change. There is, of course, a vast litera- 
ture on wage rigidity, which I will not review here. It is sufficient to say that 
the wages of all workers are not easily reduced even during periods of falling 
demand: layoffs are the more usual response. It is probably even more difficult 
to reduce the wage of an individual worker. 
If a firm is not able to reduce wages, it will adopt policies that will encourage 
separation, even though they are suboptimal compared to a wage reduction. A 
simple but effective policy will be not to allow reductions in hours worked: for 
example, someone whose productivity has fallen because of health changes or 
who finds the job particularly distasteful will have had a “taste” change toward 
not working. Given the all-or-nothing choice between working full-time or not 
working at all, such a person may choose not to work. A healthy or satisfied 
worker will not have had a change in “tastes” and will remain on the job. There- 
fore, given that individual wages cannot be reduced, hours rigidity will be an 
effective tool for inducing those workers to leave that the firm  would like to 
leave. 
A conclusion that is consistent with the evidence is that most jobs are full- 
time jobs, and although there is some variation by occupation and industry, the 
jobs have little flexibility. Workers choose jobs early in their careers according 
to what will be important to them during their work lives: the type of work, 
wages, benefits, promotion possibilities, and so forth. It may be that different 
jobs have different hours of work, but it is rare that hours may be varied once 
a job has been chosen. With the approach of  retirement some workers will 
want to reduce hours because the hours that were optimal earlier in the work 
life are not optimal later in life. But, because of wage and hours rigidities on 
their own jobs,  they cannot reduce hours without changing jobs or retiring 
completely. 
This conclusion is supported by  survey evidence. In a survey of  1,030 men 
aged 55-64  and 969 women aged 50-59,  93% of the working men and 80% 
of the working women worked full-time.’0 However, a substantial fraction of 
the full-time workers said they would like to work part-time:  18% of the men 
and 33% of the women. Although the workers were not asked why they could 
not reduce their hours, I imagine that, just as in other surveys, their employers 
would not allow them to. 
1.3  Explanations or Causes of Job Rigidities 
This section has two main goals. The first is to give evidence about the 
causes of the rigidities in the employment of workers of all ages and to find 
10. Quinn and Burkhauser 1990, based on a survey conducted by  Louis Harris and Associates. 24  Michael D. Hurd 
how these affect older workers. The second is to give evidence about additional 
factors that primarily affect older workers. 
1.3.1  Factors Affecting All Workers 
Many job rigidities are normal to the workplace and affect workers of  all 
ages. They may be caused by the economic necessity to use the capital stock 
fully or to be able to service customers during usual business hours. An im- 
portant cause of rigidities from the point of view of this paper comes from the 
theory of team production. 
Team Production 
The theory of  team production says  that the productivity of  a particular 
worker is increased (up to a point) when additional human factors of produc- 
tion are present. Other workers, other firms, and customers are, broadly speak- 
ing, additional factors of production. Clearly the extent and importance of team 
production varies across occupations and industries: all stations of an assembly 
line must be covered if production is to proceed; a barber shop must be open 
when customers want to come; yet a novelist probably requires no other human 
inputs most of  the time. This implies that those who work in jobs requiring 
team production and who work during peak labor periods will, ceteris paribus, 
have higher wages than those who work during off-peak times (Henderson 
1981). Such a relationship will vary across occupations and industries because 
of the varying intensities of team production. Wilson (1988) found that wages 
of professionals,  skilled and semiskilled workers, and production workers were 
the most sensitive to start time. Wages of clerical or sales workers were less 
sensitive. This accords with expectations about the requirements for interac- 
tion among workers in these occupations. 
If  wages are higher for workers who follow similar schedules, we would 
expect considerable bunching of  work hours. Indeed, full-time workers have 
similar schedules: in the 1985 CPS, 50.9% of full-time workers worked one of 
the four schedules: 8-5,  8-4,  7-4,  or 9-5  (Mellor 1986). There is even more 
bunching in start and stop times: 78.8% of full-time workers began work at 
either 7 A.M.,  8 A.M., or 9 A.M.; 69.5% stopped at either 4 P.M., 5 P.M., or 6 P.M. 
The amount of bunching was by necessity much less for part-time workers. 
When a job requires team production, flexibility in work hours becomes 
difficult, and this applies whether a worker permanently works different hours 
from the other workers, or when a worker is on flextime. By case study, Swart 
(1978) investigated the drawbacks of flextime and found that many are associ- 
ated with the requirements of team production. For example, a common man- 
agement complaint about flextime was that communication between depart- 
ments was weakened. Nollen and Martin (1978) found that complaints about 
and problems of flextime were associated with communication  and scheduling, 
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Despite the obvious advantages of reduced congestion and travel time and 
the accommodation of taste variation and preferences, only a small fraction of 
workers are on flextime, 12.8% in  1977 (Ronen  1984) and  12.3% in  1985 
(Mellor 1986). The percentage by occupation of those working flextime varies 
from 19.9%  in sales occupations, where many employees can work alone, to 
4.0% among machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors, where the job re- 
quires the presence of others. This variation supports the view that team pro- 
duction is an important aspect of the workplace in many occupations and in- 
dustries. 
If team production affects the availability of flextime, it will also affect the 
availability and pay of part-time work. Suppose that a substantial fraction of 
workers (not even necessarily a majority) want to work full-time during “nor- 
mal hours.” If  in  most occupations and industries individual production is 
higher when other workers are present, jobs during normal working hours will 
have higher productivity and tend to pay  more than off-hour jobs, drawing 
additional workers to those hours. Eventually a good deal of employment will 
be concentrated in normal hours. Anyone wanting to work outside of  those 
hours, whether part-time or full-time, will have lower productivity and lower 
pay. The firm will discourage anyone from working part-time during normal 
working hours because that worker’s absence during part of the normal work- 
ing day will affect the productivity of the full-time workers. 
We  do not, of course, observe everyone working the same hours. Several 
factors prevent the concentration of hours from being complete. Some workers 
have such strong tastes for unconventional hours that they are willing to work 
off hours even if their wages are less. Some services such as bus service and 
entertainment must be produced during off hours. The firm will desire to use 
its capital stock during off hours: when the capital-labor ratio is high and team 
production is important, a firm will want to have several complete teams of 
workers to use the capital stock continuously. Apparently not enough workers 
want to work off hours that a complete team can be assembled at the normal 
wage: overtime pay has to be paid. The fact that the overtime bonus is typically 
50% shows the strength of team production: the productivity of the marginal 
worker must be high indeed to justify such a large bonus. 
Fixed Costs of Employment 
The costs to a firm of employing a worker can, in principle, be divided into 
fixed costs and variable costs. Table 1.6 has estimates of such a division.lI They 
are, of course, an average because the allocation will vary from firm to firm. 
In particular, some firms have few training costs and offer no health benefits; 
then, fixed costs would be negligible. Probably the most controversial entry is 
11. The table does not include the costs of any capital the firm furnishes to the worker. 26  Michael D. Hurd 
Table 1.6  Distribution of Employment Costs 
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Source: Jondrow, Brechling, and Marcus, 1987. 
the attribution of health insurance to fixed costs. Apparently, however, compa- 
nies that offer health insurance to part-time workers typically pay  the same 
amount for the insurance as they do for a full-time worker (Paul 1983b); that 
is, health insurance is not prorated by work effort as are pension benefits, paid 
time off, and so forth.12  In this case it is a fixed cost. 
The figures are calculated for 1981. Since then, according to Health Care 
Financing Administration estimates, the real cost per person of health care has 
grown by about 38%.13 This would put health insurance costs at about 7% of 
total employment costs and total fixed costs at about 21.5% of  employment 
costs. 
Fixed costs vary with age. In particular, recruitment, hiring, and training 
costs must be amortized over expected years of employment: because newly 
hired older workers probably have a shorter work life with the new employer 
than newly hired younger workers, the implicit cost per year of employment 
will be larger.I4  Health insurance costs increase with age. Paul (1984) reports 
from a survey of employers that employees aged 55-59  have the highest health 
12. If work hours fall below one thousand per year, under the Employee Retirement Income and 
Security Act the firm  is not obligated to offer the benefit at all. In some cases, therefore, health 
insurance is not truly a fixed cost. 
13. My calculations based on the scenario of moderate growth of health care costs (Advisory 
Council 1991). 
14. Firms may react to the shorter work life by  giving less training to older workers. Although 
I have seen no studies confirming this, the net result may be that training costs are roughly invariant 
with age. However, the fixed costs of recruitment and hiring would still be greater per year of 
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Table 1.7  Percentage of Workers Participating in Health Care Plans 
Age  20-49  50-59  60-64  65-69 
Participation  61  68  79  78 
Source; Repko (1987), based on data from J. C. Penney. 
Table 1.8  Relative Cost of Medical Insurance 
Age  All Employees  Single Male 
545  I .oo  1 .oo 
45-49  1.25  1.87 
50-54  1.41  2.79 
55-59  I .56  2.84 
60-64  2.00  4.5 I 
65-69  2.81  - 
Source: U.S. Senate (1984). 
care  costs, followed by  those  65 or  over, then  those  60-64,  followed by 
younger groups.I5 
This is partly caused by  increasing participation in health care plans with 
age, as shown in Table 1.7. Furthermore, given participation in a plan, older 
workers file claims more frequently than younger workers; therefore, health 
care costs increase with age. Whether this is seen as an age-related employ- 
ment cost by  the employer depends on the method of financing health care 
insurance. Firms that self-insure would bear fully the cost difference by  age. 
If a firm buys insurance for its employees, its premium will depend on whether 
it is experience rated or community rated. If experience rated, the cost of pre- 
miums depend on the historical health care costs incurred by the firm’s employ- 
ees. Therefore, a firm that employs a disproportionate number of older workers 
should expect higher health care insurance premiums. If community rated, the 
firm’s premiums depend on the average health care costs of covered employees 
in some large local pool of employees. Then firms would have no differential 
cost for medical insurance premiums as the result of employing older workers. 
Table I .8 has estimated relative costs of providing medical insurance to em- 
ployees by  age to all employees and to single males. The costs are calculated 
from health maintenance organization (HMO) claims data on families covered 
by  group contracts, so there is surely a question about the generality of  the 
results. Nonetheless, there certainly is general agreement that health benefit 
costs increase with the age of the employee. 
The Special Committee on Aging (U.S. Senate 1984) estimated that average 
costs of health care were about 5% of pay. The report of the committee noted 
that, “[wlhile medical benefits may be worth about 5 percent of pay overall, 
15. Costs increase with age for both single employees and employees with dependents. 28  Michael D. Hurd 
for lower paid older workers this percentage could be 20 to 30 percent of pay. 
This is particularly true if the employer offers medical benefits to employees 
who work on reduced schedules. Some employers offer medical coverage to 
employees who work 20, 25, or 30 hours per week. Older persons are one of 
the groups who prefer such schedules” (46). If a firm truly does spend 4.51 
times as much in health care costs for a 60-64-year-old  single male as a 
younger single male (table 1.8), the large percentages of pay for health care 
costs in the quotation are comprehensible. In this case the fixed costs associ- 
ated with hiring an older male would be a large fraction of total costs. 
Individuals also have fixed costs of working. The only estimate of an indi- 
vidual’s fixed cost of which I am aware is an econometric estimate based on 
observed hours of  work of women. The basic idea is that fixed costs to the 
individual could explain why almost no women work just a few hours per year. 
Because many women either work a substantial number of hours or not at all, 
.he estimate of fixed costs is large: 28% of average yearly earnings (Cogan 
1981). These costs would come from the requirement for extra private trans- 
portation, work-related clothing, meals at work, and day care.I6  Casual obser- 
vation suggests that, because of day care, 28% may not be unreasonable. It 
seems high for men: in the 1986 Consumer Expenditure Survey average expen- 
ditures on items that could be counted as fixed employment costs of men are 
food away from home, 6.1%; private transportation, 19.3%; and apparel and 
services, 5.6%. These items total 31%, but, of  course, not all of these expendi- 
tures are work-related and fixed. In the example that follows I will use an esti- 
mate of 10%. 
The effect of  fixed costs on the ability of  an employer to pay  a generous 
wage to a part-time employee is rather sharp. Consider as an  example someone 
who works two thousand hours per year at $10 per hour. In line with table 1.6, 
suppose that the nonwage costs of employment equal the wage costs and that 
the firm breaks even on the worker. Then the earnings of the worker would be 
$20,000 and the product would be $40,000. Of this, I assume that fixed costs 
are 25% (adding in 3.5% for fixed capital costs to the 21.5% derived from table 
1,6), variable nonwage costs are 25% of which 18% are compensation in the 
form of pension benefits and paid time off and 7% are in the form of Federal 
Insurance Contributions Act  (FICA)  taxes,  unemployment insurance, and 
other, which are not compensation to the worker. If hours are reduced to one 
thousand, total product would be worth $20,000. Table  1.9 shows how  that 
product would be allocated. 
Fixed costs remain at $10,000, the variable costs are now $5,000, leaving 
wages of $5,000. Thus, hours fell by  50%, but earnings fell by  75% and the 
wage fell by 50%.  The fall in total compensation,  including variable nonmone- 
tary compensation,  would not be quite as great, but it would also be substantial. 
The percentage change in earnings divided by  the percentage change in 
16. Of course, some of these costs could have both fixed and variable components. 29  The Effect of Labor Market Rigidities on Older Workers 
Table 1.9  Example of Allocation of Employment Costs 











20,000  5,000 
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2,800  1,400 
40,000  20,000 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on table 1.6. 
hours is an elasticity, and with no fixed costs it would be 1.0. Here the estimate 
is 1.5. Although this may seem like a large elasticity, it is similar to estimates 
based on the observed relationship between hours and earnings. For example, 
Jondrow, Brechling, and Marcus (1987) estimated the elasticity to be  1.53; 
Owen (1976) and Rosen (1976) both estimated an elasticity of 1.4; and Clark, 
Gohmann, and Sumner (1982) estimated it to be 1.6. 
The interpretation of my example is that a reduction in hours would require 
the wage rate of  an individual to fall in order for the firm to break even. It is 
difficult to estimate this relationship from observations of individuals because 
individuals rarely reduce hours at the same firm. Gustman and Steinmeier 
(1985) reported that, in the RHS when individuals changed from full-time to 
partially retired at the same firm, their wage rate fell by  10% on average; but 
“partially retired” is self-assessed and Gustman and Steinmeier do not report 
the change in hours worked, so this result cannot be compared with the others 
I have cited. Regardless of the exact comparison, however, it seems clear that, 
in many occupations and industries, fixed costs are an important component of 
total employment costs, and, in order that a firm can cover fixed costs, money 
wage rates must be lower for part-time work than for full-time work. Therefore, 
earnings will decline at a faster rate than hours, and at some point it will not 
be worthwhile to work. 
If the worker also has fixed costs associated with working, that point will 
probably be reached at a fairly high number of hours. Suppose in my example 
that the worker has fixed costs of  working of  10% of  full-time income, or 
$2,000. Then, pretax discretionary income (after subtracting the fixed costs of 
working) would be $18,OOO  at full-time hours. Pretax discretionary income at 
half-time hours would be just $3,000, so the worker would be earning $3.00 
per hour in discretionary income. This is a low wage, indeed, to compensate 
for the disutility of working. 
This example and the estimates from the literature of the importance of  fixed 
costs imply that most workers will work enough hours to cover both the fixed 
costs of the firm and of the worker, yet still leave adequate money earnings for 
the worker. Part-time work will be associated with low pay, and there will be a 
minimum number of hours of work. The relationship between hours and the 
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in fixed costs; similarly the minimum number of hours will vary across occupa- 
tions and industries. This is what we observe both across occupations and in- 
dustries and across individuals: occupations and industries in  which there is 
considerable part-time work have lower average wage rates, and individuals 
who work part-time have lower average wage rates.” 
1.3.2  Factors Particularly Affecting Older Workers 
This section discusses other factors that particularly affect older workers, 
and how normal work practices affect the labor market activity of older work- 
ers. The discussion considers the effects on reducing hours on the main job, 
the effects on changing jobs to reduce hours, and the effects on complete re- 
tirement. 
Social Security 
The earnings test under Social Security reduces the Social Security benefits 
of a retired worker between the ages of 62 and 65 by  $1 for every $2 earned, 
beginning at the exempt amount of  $7,680  in  1993.18 Thus, a worker with a 
wage of $10 per hour could work no more than 768 hours per year without 
facing a Social Security benefit reduction. From the discussion of fixed costs 
and team production of  the last section, this level of work effort would not 
sustain a wage rate of $10 unless the worker had a job with little fixed costs, 
including fixed-cost fringe benefits. 
The earnings test interacts with the Social Security provision of  reduced 
benefits for early retirement: an eligible worker may draw Social Security ben- 
efits beginning at age 62, but the benefit is permanently reduced by  5/9% for 
each month in which benefits are drawn before the age of  65. The reduction 
factor, about 7% per year, was meant to be actuarially fair, and at a real interest 
rate of 3% it is approximately fair. Therefore, a worker contemplating drawing 
benefits at age 62 should realize that the total value of the expected stream of 
benefits is approximately independent of  retiring at 62 or working an addi- 
tional month because the eventual increase in the stream of benefits will com- 
pensate for the lost benefits from delaying retirement for a month. What the 
worker may  not realize, however, is that any monthly benefits lost under the 
earnings test are treated in the same way, except benefits are not increased until 
age 65, when they are recalculated to take into account lost benefits due to the 
earnings test. For example, a worker who retired at 62 and then at age 63 took 
a part-time job resulting in  the loss of  three months’  benefits would have 
monthly benefits increased permanently by  3X(5+9)% beginning at age 65. 
Therefore, before age 65 the earnings test is not really a tax: it is forced saving. 
According to  lifetime utility-maximizing models in  which  individuals can 
17. I realize that the empirical observations may not hold constant individual characteristics that 
18. Over age 65 the reduction is $1  to $3, beginning at the exempt amount of $10,560. 
affect productivity and, therefore, do not correspond to the theory as completely as I would like. 31  The Effect of Labor Market Rigidities on Older Workers 
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Fig. 1.2  Distribution of “retired” workers 
Source: Burtless and Moffitt (1985), based on the Retirement History Survey. 
freely borrow and lend, the earnings test should have no effect on the choice 
of how much to work. 
The empirical fact, however, is that the earnings test seems to have important 
effects. Burtless and Moffitt (1985) calculated from the RHS the distribution 
of annual hours of work where the points in the distribution are percentages of 
the exempt amount. This calculation can show the importance of the earnings 
test because, if it is an important determinant in the choice of hours, we would 
expect to  see many workers  choosing hours at or just beneath  the exempt 
amount. Figure  1.2 shows the distribution of hours in the RHS of  “retired” 
workers aged 62 or over who are still working.19  The figure shows a remarkable 
19. Someone is defined to be retired if he or  she has a sudden and discontinuous drop in hours 
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Fig. 1.3  Effect of earnings test on annual income 
bunching of workers near the exempt amount: 14% have hours in the range of 
91% to 100% of the exempt amount; 12% have hours in the range of  101%  to 
110%. Given that the data have observation  error and that it is probably difficult 
for a worker to reach exactly the exempt amount, the figure shows that workers 
respond to the earnings test in a way not predicted by  the utility-maximizing 
models. The models hold that lifetime wealth is the important determinant of 
behavior, whereas the figure suggests that annual (or monthly) income is also 
important. 
The difference is illustrated in Figure 1.3, which shows the relationship be- 
tween annual work and annual income. If a worker could not borrow or lend, 
this would be the annual budget constraint. Point A is the exempt amount of 
annual hours, which corresponds to the  100% point in figure 1.2. Between 
points A and B benefits are reduced by $1 for each $2 of earnings, effectively 
reducing income from working by  50%. At B (the breakeven point) benefits 
have been reduced to zero, so earnings increase at the wage rate. With this 
budget constraint, utility maximization will lead to bunching of hours at zero 
and at A. We  should also observe hours spread from zero to A, and far above 
B. This is almost exactly what we find: we already know that most have zero 
hours; Burtless and Moffitt found that 22% of the working retired had hours 
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Fig. 1.4  Distribution of retired workers 
Source; Author’s calculations from Iams (1987).  based on the New Beneficiary Survey. 
110% of the exempt amount. Just 13% had hours between 110% and 150% of 
the exempt amount. 
I know of no other study that gives such detailed distributions of hours. Iams 
(1987) gives the distribution of  workers aged 64 or less by  earnings level in 
the New Beneficiary Survey (NBS).*O  In this sample, the workers have already 
drawn some Social Security benefits, so they are aware of the test. Figure 1.4 
shows the density of  workers who have already left their longest employer, so 
they are in transition jobs. The figure shows a very sharp peak near the exempt 
amount ($4,440). This is a somewhat more convincing case than in Burtless 
and Moffitt: some of the Burtless and Moffitt sample is 65 or over, and at those 
ages the earnings test is really a tax, whereas in Iams all are younger than 65. 
I conclude that in both the RHS and the NBS, many  working recipients of 
20. These would be men who had “retired” in the sense that they had begun to receive Social 
Security benefits, but they either were still working or had gone back to work. 34  Michael D. Hurd 
Social Security retirement benefits have hours of work that place them near the 
exempt amount. This is good evidence that workers believe that the earnings 
test has at least some characteristics of a tax. 
One explanation for the tax nature of the earnings test is that most workers 
do not know that benefits forgone through the earnings test will be regained at 
age 65. Some mild support for this point of view comes from Quinn, Burk- 
hauser, and Myers (1990). They study the bunching of hours near the exempt 
amount as the age of the worker varies. The relative amount of bunching of 
those 65 or over is about the same as of those 62-64,  even though the earnings 
test is a true tax at 65 or over but not below 65. Furthermore, I believe this 
explanation is likely because I have spoken to economists who do research in 
the  economics of aging, and many  of them were unaware of the automatic 
benefit recalculation. Another explanation is that we have an inadequate under- 
standing of  how workers react to a complicated program that has a feature that 
acts partly like a tax and partly  like a savings mechanism. My conclusion is 
that  we  really  do not  know  what  causes the  clustering  around  the exempt 
amount. 
The earnings test seems to discourage work. Besides its obvious effects on 
the lifetime income of the worker, it seems to affect the employment opportuni- 
ties of older workers. Paul (1987, 172) reports on a survey of twenty-five man- 
agers who administered work programs in their organizations. 
The Social Security retirement earnings test was identified by  eight of  the 
managers as the greatest disincentive to work for Social Security beneficiar- 
ies. The managers administering retiree labor pools expressed frustration in 
the fact that once retirees who are receiving Social Security earn $6,000 (the 
1982 maximum earnings limitation2') they usually cease working,  or they 
will limit their work hours, upon re-employment,  so as not to exceed the 
$6,000 limit. This common work pattern of many retirees not only restricts 
management5 use of  this type of employee, but is also symptomatic of  the 
financial  disincentive  associated  with  prolonged  employment  during re- 
tirement. 
I put the emphasis in this quotation to point out that the earnings test may well 
discourage the development of programs for part-time work: management will 
often need to ask workers with particular skills to work more than the exempt 
amount,  and if  workers consistently  refuse, it may not be worth the cost of 
maintaining such programs. 
Pension Plans 
Apparently  defined-benefit  pension  plans  have  substantial  effects  on the 
work choices of employees. Most of  the research has been directed  to their 
2 I. The discussion is about workers aged 65 or over. For them the exempt amount is higher than 
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most obvious effect, the effect on retirement, which I will discuss later in this 
paper, but they also have an influence on hours of work before retirement. 
Although there are thousands of defined-benefit pension plans, many have 
formulas for rates of  accrual of pension benefits of the form b = k X e X y,  in 
which b is the benefit, k is a constant factor, e is some measure of earnings 
near the end of work life such as the final year’s earnings or an average of the 
final two years’ earnings, and y is years of service. In that b is the annual benefit 
for the retired lifetime, a reduction in earnings near retirement will have a large 
effect on lifetime wealth. For example, if e is just the final year’s earnings, a 
decrease in earnings of 10% will reduce pension benefits by lo%,  which trans- 
lates into a lifetime wealth loss of about 150% of annual earnings.2z  That is, 
the financial loss of reducing hours in the year before retirement can easily be 
greater than  an entire year’s  earnings. Therefore,  a worker will  not  want to 
reduce hours if pension benefits depend on current earnings. 
A common way to avoid this problem is to have the worker “retire,” fixing 
the benefit, and then be rehired as a consultant or outside employee who has 
no benefits,  and particularly no accrual of pension. In some cases, however, 
the consultant can work only a limited number of hours without losing pension 
benefits:  under the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (ERISA) 
retirees who are reemployed for more than forty hours per month can have 
their pension benefits suspended. Although some managers mentioned this as 
a barrier to hiring retirees on a part-time basis, it was viewed to be a minor 
factor compared with the Social Security earnings test (Paul 1987). 
An aspect that could be quite important under some circumstances has to do 
with inflation risk. While a worker is employed under a defined-benefit plan, 
pension benefits are on average protected against inflation risk because prices 
and money wages change at about the same rates.  Thus, if there  is general 
inflation during the last five years of work life, money wages should increase 
by the same amount, keeping the real value of the pension at the point of retire- 
ment about the same. Typically, however, pensions once taken are not protected 
against inflation, so that a worker who retires early and is then rehired at fewer 
hours will not have inflation protection for the pension.23  This method of reduc- 
ing hours on the main job exposes a worker to considerable inflation risk com- 
pared with staying on the main job longer and then retiring completely. 
ERISA and Health Insurance 
I have already discussed how firms that are experience rated or that self- 
insure will have to spend more on the health insurance of older workers, mak- 
22. Discounting will convert a real lifetime income flow of $1  at age 65 into a wealth equivalent 
23.  During the  high-inflation decade of the  1970s.  firms often  made ad hoc adjustments in 
of ahout $15. 
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ing the fixed costs of  older workers greater. This will, of course, restrict the 
lower bound on hours that will be financially acceptable both to the firm and 
the employee. The fixed cost of health insurance can be eliminated, however, 
if annual hours are not allowed to reach one thousand; then, under ERISA, the 
firm need not pay health insurance or other benefits available to all workers. 
Apparently this is often a management strategy: in a survey of  six programs 
that form pools of labor from retirees, Paul (1987) found that they all restricted 
the number of hours to less than one thousand. The general attitude of  the 
managers who were surveyed was that “if the 1000-hour rule were eliminated, 
their organizations would permit part-time personnel, particularly retirees, to 
work more hours” (172). It is difficult to know how much of  this is simply 
self-serving, but because of  the costs involved, I believe it should be taken 
seriously. A further reason is that these surveys were made during the early 
1980s, when health care costs were substantially lower than today, and when 
the projections of health care costs were not nearly so pessimistic as they are 
today. 
Under the thousand-hour rule the firm would like to keep hours below one 
thousand hours so that medical insurance could be eliminated. The worker 
might want to work more than one thousand hours, both because the drop from 
two thousand to one thousand hours is too abrupt and because he or she re- 
quires medical insurance. The outcome of these incompatible desires will de- 
pend on the alternatives of each side. The main option of the older worker is 
to retire. The firm can hire young workers who may not care about health insur- 
ance and who want to work less than one thousand hours. Then the firm can 
retain the health insurance benefit for its full-time workers while eliminating 
it for its part-time workers. 
1.3.3 
hours. 
Special Job Skills 
Over time an employee acquires skills and knowledge about the firm that 
increase productivity at that firm. Such skills and knowledge are called specific 
human capital because they are specific to the firm. Skills and knowledge that 
would increase productivity should the worker change to another firm are 
called general human capital. When a firm hires a worker who is expected to 
remain for many years, it will be in the firm’s interest to invest in the specific 
human capital of the worker; this kind of investment is thought to be an im- 
portant cause of rising productivity paths early in a worker’s career. Obviously 
some skills cannot be defined as either specific or general: the definition will 
depend on the alternative employment. For example, most of  the skills of  a 
General Motors employee will transfer to Ford, but few of them will transfer 
Impediments to a Job Change at Older Ages 
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to a Wall  Street law firm. The general point is nonetheless valid: over time 
workers become more valuable to a particular firm than to any other firm, so 
that, at least potentially, the firm can pay the worker more than any other firm 
could. 
Some productivity-increasing  activities are not specific human capital in an 
obvious way, but they still have the characteristics of specific human capital. 
For example, the search for a good match between a firm and a worker may 
involve several rounds of hiring and quitting or firing. This is a costly activity, 
but both the worker and the firm are willing to bear the cost if  the payback 
period is sufficiently  long. Once a good match has been found, the costs of the 
search that led to the match should be considered part of specific human capi- 
tal. This particular example is germane to understanding why the turnover rates 
of young and older workers cannot easily be compared. Young workers have 
higher turnover rates because of the search for a good match: if a good match 
is found, however, the payback period is much longer. Therefore, both the firm 
and  the  worker  are  willing to bear the  greater turnover costs of  younger 
workers. 
Often unions negotiate job pay or title by seniority rather than by productiv- 
ity. From the point of view of the worker this looks like specific human capital 
because the seniority has no value at another firm. From the point of view of 
the firm it is the way of determining the shape of the lifetime wage trajectory, 
but to the extent that pay late in the career is not connected to productivity, the 
firm will have an incentive to get rid of highly paid older workers. It is surely 
no accident that, as will be discussed later, defined-benefit pensions are most 
often found in unionized firms, and that the pensions have provisions that en- 
courage retirement. 
As this discussion suggests, older workers who change employers, whether 
the change is to full-time or part-time employment,  can expect a fall in produc- 
tivity because of the loss of specific human capital. Furthermore, because of a 
short payback period on the new job, extensive job search to find the best 
match is not warranted, so the starting wage will be lower than the highest that 
could be found in the market. The new employee cannot expect rapid wage 
growth because, again, the short payback period will cause the new employer 
not to want to invest in specific human capital. 
If an older worker had maintained or increased his or her general human 
capital, a job change would not occasion a large fall in productivity. However, 
most older workers probably have  little general human  capital: during the 
many years since schooling the initial stock of general human capital would 
have depreciated; there is little financial incentive for investment in general 
human capital on the part of the firm because the employee can simply leave, 
taking the investment to another firm. 
If an older worker wants to reduce hours but cannot on the main job because 
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industry will offer a similar job, but at reduced hours, because of its own fixed 
costs and requirements of team production. Therefore, the older worker will 
have  to change occupations or industries. This seems to be common. In  the 
NLS 59% of the job changes following retirement from the main job were to 
a different occupation and 52% were to a different industry (Parnes and Nestel 
1981). In the RHS just 12% of the changes from career jobs by men aged 60 
or over were to the same occupation and industry (Ruhm 1990a). In the CPS 
job changes at older ages tend to concentrate workers in just a few industries 
(Hutchens 1988). 
These figures show a remarkable amount of mobility across occupations and 
industries. Practically by definition these will be easy entry jobs that require 
few specific skills, a rather low level of  general skills, and minimal search 
costs because of the short payback period. They cannot have large fixed costs 
or the wage rate would be unacceptably low, given the reduced hours. Further- 
more, because the older worker loses the specific human capital acquired dur- 
ing the work life with a particular firm, he or she must compete in a labor 
market with a pool of rather unskilled labor, which may have low opportunity 
costs of its time. For example, students need jobs with approximately the same 
characteristics as a job the older worker would switch to; and  students are 
willing to work for rather low wages. Therefore, forces of supply and demand 
will tend to keep the wage rate low. We  would expect, then, that jobs taken 
after retirement from the main job for the purpose of reducing hours, will have 
low wage rates. 
This is a universal finding: In the RHS wage rates of men fell 30% on aver- 
age at job change (Gustman and Steinmeier 1985). In the NLS the median 
wage change was  -39%,  and 71% of  those changing jobs had a wage loss 
(Parnes and Nestel 1981). Average wage rates fell by  18%, according to a sur- 
vey of eighteen hundred retirees from three large corporations (Morse, Dutka, 
and Gray  1983). In  the NBS the wage rates of men who continued to work 
after initial receipt of Social Security benefits fell by about 50% (Iams 1987). 
Table 1.10 has some details of the change in wage rates at a job change. Of 
those who reduced hours on their career job, 36% had a wage gain of  more 
than $2.50 (1984 dollars), and just 24% had a wage loss of more than $2.50. It 
appears, therefore, that if  someone can reduce hours on the career job, the 
wage rate can be expected to remain about the same. Almost half  of  those 
who changed to a new full-time job had roughly constant wage rates, but the 
percentage having a wage loss (42%) is much greater than the percentage hav- 
ing a wage gain. The table makes clear that changing to part-time on a new 
job causes the largest decline in wages. This is, of course, consistent with an 
explanation based on the loss of specific job skills and fixed costs. 
Fringe Benefits 
Fringe benefits are a barrier to job change at older ages. Partly this is be- 
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Table 1.10  Wage Change of Men on Leaving Full-Time Lifetime Jobs 
(% distribution) 
Type of Transition 
To Part-Time  To Full-Time  To Part-Time 
Wage Change  on Same Job  on New Job  on New Job 
>$2.50 
-$2.50  to $2.50 
1-$2.50 
Total 
















Source: Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers (1990). based on Retirement History Survey. 
pensation is greater than what is indicated from the wage rate changes. This 
would be true for someone of any age changing into those jobs. 
Changes in fringe benefits at a change in job have not been studied nearly 
as much as changes in wages; in particular, I have not seen any data from the 
PSID, the RHS, or the NLS on how benefits changed. However, at older ages 
the incidence of fringe benefits surely falls at job change because many job 
changes are into the service sector, which has a much lower incidence of fringe 
benefits than the manufacturing sector. Some evidence comes from Morse, 
Dutka, and Gray (1983), who report that just 29% of the retirees who continued 
to work in their survey had fringe benefits on their new jobs. 
Fringe benefits are a barrier to job change at older ages, however, partly 
because of  the particular requirements of  older workers for some kinds of 
fringe benefits. Health insurance is especially important for older workers, so 
its loss entails a large loss in compensation on average. But preexisting condi- 
tions may  well mean that, even if the new job offers medical insurance, the 
new  worker may  not be allowed the benefit. This means that the equivalent 
monetary loss of moving to a new job and losing medical insurance is much 
greater than the average cost of medical insurance: were someone with a preex- 
isting condition to purchase medical insurance privately, the cost would depend 
on the condition, increasing the fair market price. 
It is difficult to know the extent and importance of the reduction in job mo- 
bility due to preexisting conditions. Surveys of  the population show a large 
incidence: 30% of the respondents to a CBS-New  York Times poll answered 
yes to the question “Have you or anyone else in your household ever decided 
to stay in a job you  wanted to leave mainly because you  didn’t want to lose 
health coverage?’ (New York Times, 6 September 1991). Madrian (1994) used 
the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey to study job mobility of mar- 
ried men. She estimated that the “job-lock” aspects of not having medical in- 
surance reduced job mobility from 16% per year to 12%. Based on the 1973 
Quality of  Employment Survey, Mitchell (1983) estimated that men  would 
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a firm with health insurance to one without health insurance. This is much 
more than the cost of simply purchasing health insurance, which indicates that 
preexisting conditions are important. 
Defined-benefit plans have many provisions that can affect job mobility, but 
some have only minor effects. In particular, vesting in a new plan is not particu- 
larly important to younger workers because of the long period before retire- 
ment benefits are paid: private defined-benefit plans are not indexed between 
the time of separation from the firm and the receipt of benefits, so that inflation 
as well as discounting makes the present value from vesting small. Among 
workers nearing retirement, vesting is more important. For example, five years 
of service could give a pension of 510% of salary, which has a wealth equiva- 
lent of about a year’s earnings. 
The effect on the mobility of worker with many years of service will depend 
on the nature of the pension plan and on the wage path of the worker. Consider 
again the simplified plan b =  k X e X y,  in which b is the benefit, k is a constant 
factor taken in this example to be 0.02, e is the final year’s earnings, and y is 
years of service. If e increases linearly with years of service, as would be the 
case when the same raise is given each year, then b increases in the square of 
y. Then, the gain in benefits from an additional year of  service is linear in y, 
and the value of an additional year of service is very much greater at the end 
of a long work life than at the beginning. This should, of course, reduce mobil- 
ity toward the end of work life.24 
Even if  someone has reached the maximum number of years’ service for 
pension accrual so that no additional pension is earned with additional service, 
early retirement from the firm to change jobs will cause a loss of real pension 
wealth: defined-benefit plans are not formally inflation-protected following 
separation from the firm, so the pension will lose value at the rate of inflation. 
Furthermore, because the rate of inflation can change unexpectedly, the pen- 
sion is exposed to inflation risk: a rate of pension loss that is judged acceptable 
at retirement could increase in an unexpected way. 
Defined-benefit pensions can change in an important way the financial in- 
centives to remain with an employer. We would expect that, depending on the 
nature of the plan and the characteristics of  the employee, they  would have 
strong effects of mobility. Apparently, as I will discuss in the next section, 
they do. 
1.3.4  Factors Influencing Complete Retirement 
Pension Plans 
Defined-benefit plans have widely differing patterns of accrual and of bene- 
fit adjustments for the age of retirement. I will speak of typical plans, but it 
should be kept in mind that the plans are very heterogeneous. 
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At  some combinations of  years of  service and age, defined-benefit plans 
strongly discourage mobility. For example, a plan may effectively offer Social 
Security benefits at age 60 to someone who stays with the firm until 60 and 
then retires. This would be done by augmenting until age 62 the worker’s pen- 
sion benefits by the amount of  Social Security the worker will get at 62. Thus, 
a 59-year-old worker could earn two years of Social Security benefits by work- 
ing one year, in addition to salary and any increment in pension. Such a worker 
would be discouraged from complete retirement or from reducing hours by 
changing employers. This example is one of many aspects of defined-benefit 
plans that change the compensation of working another year on the main job. 
The adjustment for delaying retirement past the normal retirement age is 
often not actuarially fair in a defined-benefit plan. Although eliminating ac- 
crual on the basis of age is not longer allowed under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (1986), it can be capped for reaching maximum years of 
service. In combination with the actuarial adjustment, the financial reward for 
another year of work can be substantially  below money earnings. Kotlikoff and 
Wise (1987) give an example based on a firm’s actual defined-benefit plan in 
which the wage of a 61-year-old worker is effectively reduced by  14%. In other 
examples, the reduction can be considerably greater. 
The influence of the particular features of the plans on worker mobility rates 
is well documented (Burkhauser 1979; Stock and Wise 1990a, 1990b; Kotli- 
koff and Wise 1989; Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise 1994). In these studies and 
others, workers respond strongly to the incentives built into the plans: at some 
ages, the incentive’to  remain at the firm is strong and we observe little mobility; 
at other ages the incentives to leave are strong, and we observe considerable 
separation. For example, in a firm studied by  Kotlikoff and Wise, someone 
leaving the firm at age 55 could get substantially  higher pensions benefits than 
someone leaving at age 54. The difference depends on the circumstances of 
the worker: Kotlikoff and Wise give a case of  someone with  earnings of 
$42,000 whose pension wealth is increased by $30,000 by staying from age 54 
to 55. Accordingly the rate of  separation of  those with twenty-one or more 
years of service is 2% at age 54 and 11% at age 55. 
Defined-contribution plans do not have such strong incentives as defined- 
benefit plans. They do, of course, have a wealth effect because they represent 
forced saving that the worker might not have done otherwise; if this happens, 
the worker will arrive at retirement age with more economic resources than 
otherwise. By itself, this is not an impediment to the choice of  work effort: 
provided a worker can finance consumption from other assets, the level of con- 
sumption can be chosen independently from income in a particular year. How- 
ever, even defined-contribution pensions may influence the age of retirement 
through a so-called liquidity effect. Imagine a defined-contribution plan that 
puts a large fraction of a worker’s compensation in the plan, so much that the 
worker does not want to save anything in addition for retirement. As the worker 
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that consumption will be higher in retirement than before retirement, which 
would cause the worker to want to borrow against the future retirement benefits 
to finance greater consumption before retirement. If  there are capital market 
imperfections or if the benefits cannot be used as collateral, the borrowing will 
not happen and consumption before retirement is liquidity constrained: the 
worker has the assets (future benefit payments) but cannot use them to achieve 
the desired consumption path. Then, the level of the benefit payment will in- 
fluence the choice of retirement age: the worker will tend to retire earlier than 
if  consumption could be chosen independently from retirement. That is, the 
person’s income stream is conditioned by work status, and capital market im- 
perfections cannot be used to allow consumption to be chosen independently 
from the income stream. Thus, consumption and work status must be chosen 
jointly,  causing  the  choice  of  retirement  age  to  depend  on  the  defined- 
contribution plan.25 
As far as I know, the effects of  defined-contribution plans on retirement age 
through the liquidity constraint have not been empirically studied. However, 
Social Security can, in principle, have a similar effect, and there is some empir- 
ical evidence that it does have. I will look at this evidence in connection with 
my discussion of Social Security. 
Defined-contribution plans can affect retirement in at least two other ways. 
The continuing accrual of benefits under a defined-contribution plan may  be 
capped for years of service, which changes the reward from working. Inflation 
affects the assets in a defined-contribution plan differently from the assets in a 
defined-benefit plan.  Before  retirement  a  defined-benefit plan  subjects  a 
worker to little inflation risk; the effect of inflation on a defined-contribution 
plan will depend on how the worker’s assets are invested, so no generalization 
can be made. After retirement the effects will be the same if  both types of 
pension plans lead to a nominal annuity. 
Overall  we  observe  that  workers  covered  by  pensions  have  fewer job 
changes at younger ages and higher retirement rates at greater ages. At younger 
ages mobility is reduced primarily because of the incentives from the plans 
and because the jobs associated with pension plans seem to be better jobs. For 
example, in the 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation, the rate of 
job change by  30-50-year-old  males was 20% among those without pensions 
and 6%  among those with pensions (Gustman and Steinmeier 1993). Yet  there 
was little difference in mobility according to whether the plan was a defined- 
benefit plan or a defined-contribution plan. Because defined-contribution  plans 
are completely portable, offering no impediments to job change, this result 
suggests that the reduced mobility is caused by  other factors associated with 
jobs that have pensions. In particular, jobs with pensions seem to be better 
25. The same reasoning applies if  the defined-contribution plan can be cashed out rather than 
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jobs: they pay  more even after accounting for observable worker characteris- 
tics. Furthermore, workers who leave jobs that have pensions have lower earn- 
ings on their new jobs, whereas workers who leave jobs that do not have pen- 
sions have higher earnings (Gustman and Steinmeier 1993). 
Early retirement has long been associated with pensions because of the his- 
torical dominance of defined-benefit plans with their incentives for retirement. 
However, defined-contribution plans have grown at a much greater rate, so that 
by  1987 only about 68% of active participants in a pension plan had a defined- 
benefit plan (Turner and Beller 1992). The pension coverage rate was 42% of 
the workforce in 1988, so that only about one-third of workers were covered 
under a defined-benefit plan. Of course, benefit levels in many of these plans 
are not great enough to influence behavior in a substantial way.26  Therefore, 
defined-benefit  plans may explain the retirement behavior of some, but only of 
a minority. And their influence is diminishing. 
Social Security 
Social Security affects retirement in a number of ways. Historically, incre- 
mental Social Security taxes caused benefits to increase at such a high rate 
that,  taken  by  itself,  the  accrual  of  benefits  encouraged  later  retirement 
(Blinder, Gordon, and Wise 1983). In effect the reward from an additional year 
of work was substantially greater than the wage rate. Because of the indexing 
of wages and maturing of the system, that is no longer the case for most work- 
ers: in fact, Social Security contributions will be a true tax for a worker with 
many years of contributions and steady earnings because any additional contri- 
butions will not increase the benefit. However, a worker with a small number 
of  years of contributions could accrue higher benefits from additional Social 
Security contributions, but I imagine the overall effect of the accrual of benefits 
is rather small. 
As I discussed earlier, the reduction in benefits for early retirement is ap- 
proximately actuarially fair. The system should not affect retirement before the 
age of 65 through any “price”  effect^,^' although it has a wealth effect through 
forced saving in the manner I discussed in connection with defined contribu- 
tion plans. After age 65 the delayed retirement credit increases benefits for 
each month by which retirement is delayed or for each month in which benefits 
are lost due to the earnings test. Until 1986 the delayed retirement credit was 
3% per year, far lower than what is actuarially fair. This undoubtedly encour- 
26. In  1988 just 17% of households aged 65-74  received more than 20% of  their income from 
private pensions (Grad 1990). Thus, even among the recently retired, pension income is a rather 
minor source for most households. 
27. By price effects I mean the change in the present value of benefits when the age of retirement 
changes. Between the ages of 62 and 65, this change is roughly zero. The system could still affect 
the retirement of someone with a number of years of zero or low Social Security contributions 
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aged the very high rates of retirement at age 65: for example, in the RHS 24% 
of men working on their sixty-fifth birthday had retired within three months of 
their birthdays (Blau 1994). 
Beginning in 1990 the delayed retirement credit began to rise; in  1993 it 
was 4% per year, and by  the year 2009 it will be 8% per year, which will be 
approximately actuarially fair. Therefore, by 2009 the system should, in prin- 
ciple, have no price effects either through the reduction for early retirement or 
through the delayed retirement credit once a worker has reached 62. 
Despite the apparent fairness of  the reduction for early retirement, we ob- 
serve high rates of retirement at age 62. What is the explanation? A liquidity 
constraint is  one  possible  explanation. As  discussed in  connection with 
defined-contribution  pensions, an income stream such as Social Security bene- 
fits that is contingent on work status can affect retirement when a worker can- 
not borrow against the future income stream (Crawford and Lilien 1981). The 
effect will be to reduce retirement in the ages just before eligibility for benefits 
and increase retirement at the age of first benefit. Hurd and Boskin (1984) 
found in the RHS that workers with a high ratio of Social Security benefits to 
private assets had less retirement at age 61 and more retirement at age 62 than 
workers with a lower ratio. This is mild evidence for a liquidity constraint. 
Burtless and Moffitt (1986) and Kahn (1988) also find evidence for a liquidity 
constraint.  As far as the Social Security tax is concerned, the system has effects 
similar to the income tax because earnings are taxed, whereas the Social Secu- 
rity benefits of most beneficiaries are not taxed. I know of no empirically based 
estimates of these effects. 
Over the past fifty years, the Social Security system has provided enough 
retirement income so that people could retire earlier and earlier. Today  the 
labor force participation rate of men is about 45% at age 63. The structure of 
the program causes retirement to be concentrated at certain ages. Figure 1.5 
has the retirement hazard rates of men and women. The retirement hazard rate 
is the probability of retirement at each age, given participation at the preceding 
age.28  For example, the hazard rate of men at age 62 is about 0.22, indicating 
that, of those men who reach 62 and are still working, 22% leave the labor 
force while 62. Particularly for men, the graph has spikes at 62 and 65, which 
are, of course, important ages in the Social Security system. Retirement rates 
appear to be slightly depressed at 64, probably because people are waiting 
until 65 to retire, and at 66, probably because of the large number that retired 
at 65. Retirement of women is less highly concentrated at 62 and 65 because 
husbands and wives tend to coordinate their retirement dates: because of the 
age difference between husbands and wives (about three years on  average), 
28. The hazards in the figure were calculated from the assumption that participation is steady 
over time: the retention rate at age t is just the labor force participation rate at age r divided by the 
participation rate at age r -  1, and the hazard rate is just one minus the retention rate. Although 
the hazard rate in the figure is calculated from cross-section CPS  data, its shape is similar to what 
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Fig. 1.5  Retirement hazard rates 
Source: Author’s calculations from  1988 and 1989 Current Population Survey participation rates 
by single years of age. 
more women  retire before the age of 62 (Hurd  1990a). If  the spikes were 
smoothed out, the retirement hazards would have an upward trend, which is 
consistent with the view that gradually changing tastes as the population ages 
increase the probability of retirement gradually. 
In my  view the spikes in the retirement hazards are good evidence of the 
effects of Social Security system on retirement. First, in microdata where we 
can control for details of any pension plan, retirement spikes at age 62 and 65 
are still found (Burkhauser 1979; Stock and Wise 1990a, 1990b). Second, in 
data from other countries where the important ages for retirement under the 
public pension system are different from the ages in the United States, we find 
spikes at those ages. For example, in Germany public pension income is about 
95% of total retirement income. Special ages for retirement under the pension 
system are 60, 63, and 65, and the retirement hazard rate peaks at those ages. 
The third reason for thinking that Social Security has an important effect on 
retirement is that there is no other alternative explanation for the fall in partici- 
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most of  their income, so it is hard to imagine that they would have retired as 
early had their Social Security benefits been considerably smaller. 
Despite the obvious links between retirement and Social Security, econo- 
metric models of  retirement based on lifetime utility maximization typically 
find that variations in Social Security have only small effects on retirement 
(Burtless and Moffitt  1984, 1985; Fields and Mitchell  1984; Gustman and 
Steinmeier 1986).  Although it is hard to show because of how complicated the 
models are, I believe the difference primarily comes from observation errors: 
we  do not observe accurately in the data the variables that  influence deci- 
sions.2' Due to observation error we see apparent change in explanatory vari- 
ables, but with no change in behavior, and so we conclude that workers are not 
responsive to financial incentives, whether they are incentives in the Social 
Security system or simply the wealth effect of the Social Security program. 
However, in situations where we have good data on the incentives facing work- 
ers, we  find that they respond strongly to incentives: for example, in the re- 
search on defined-benefit pensions where we have detailed information of the 
firm's plan, we find strong responses. 
Health Care Insurance 
Although employer-provided medical insurance may not have been an im- 
portant determinant of retirement fifteen or twenty years ago, I believe that, 
because of the rapid growth in the per capita cost of medical care, it must be 
today. It affects retirement in two broad ways.  First, medical insurance pro- 
vided by  an employer is a valuable benefit simply because it is expensive; that 
is, it is an  important component of  total compensation. Second, it provides 
employees access to the firm's risk pool. 
A firm's risk pool (its employees) is selected for reasons other than health 
status, so that the pool should have average health characteristics. This would 
not be the case if the employees as individuals had to purchase medical insur- 
ance privately because fellow purchasers (the risk pool) are self-selected and 
tend to be at higher than average risk for medical expenses. Therefore, pri- 
vately purchased health insurance is more expensive than group insurance ob- 
tained through an employer. At older ages many workers have medical condi- 
tions  (preexisting conditions), and  should they  want  to  purchase  medical 
insurance they will join the risk pool of everyone with preexisting conditions. 
Because the risk of high expenses is great for that pool, medical insurance will 
be more expensive than if the risk pool contains e~eryone.~" 
This illustrates the difference between ex ante and ex post risk. A group 
can agree to share future medical expenditures, knowing ex ante that some 
29. We probably do not observe the structure of the Social Security with much error; I have in 
30. Of course, some individuals with preexisting conditions are almost uninsurable. 
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individuals in the group (but not which ones) will eventually require high med- 
ical expenditures. Ex post, after some information is available about which 
individuals are more likely to require high medical expenditures, the group 
divides into subgroups along the new risk lines. The individuals in the high- 
risk group can expect to share higher medical costs than they anticipated ex 
ante. Under the usual assumption that individuals are risk averse, it is in the 
interest of everyone ex ante not to allow the formation of ex post risk groups. 
This, however, is exactly what happens when someone leaves a firm’s risk pool 
with a preexisting condition: he or she moves from an ex ante risk pool to an 
ex post risk pool and will face higher medical insurance costs in the new pool. 
It can be worth a considerable amount to an individual to remain in the ex 
ante risk pool. This is particularly true if  the writers of privately purchased 
medical insurance have the right to cancel a policy when new health informa- 
tion is revealed. Then, the privately purchased insurance no longer has the 
aspects of true insurance. 
It has been difficult to study quantitatively the effects of medical insurance 
on retirement because it is hard to control for other influences on retirement. 
It is even more difficult to control for unobserved heterogeneity arising from 
variation in risk aversion across individuals and from prior conditions, both of 
which make the response to the availability of medical insurance differ across 
 individual^.^' We do see considerable retirement at age 65, which may be par- 
tially due to the availability of  Medicare at 65: someone with medical insur- 
ance on the job but without employer-provided medical insurance to its retirees 
would probably delay retirement from age 64 to 65 when Medicare is available. 
Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1994) speculate on such an effect: their model 
accounts for the financial incentives in pension plans and Social Security, yet 
it cannot explain the excessive retirement at age 65. The only remaining expla- 
nation seems to be the availability of Medicare at age 65. This is an important 
topic for future research. 
Age Discrimination 
I have been discussing rigidities caused by legitimate employment practices 
and financial incentives. A very different kind of rigidity comes from age dis- 
crimination. Several examples of past employment practices suggest that age 
discrimination was widespread at one time, and although age discrimination is 
now illegal, employers may still desire to discriminate on the basis of age. In 
the 1970s mandatory retirement was quite common. For example, in the RHS 
44% of  white males in wage and salary jobs aged 58-61  faced mandatory 
retirement  (Gustman and  Steinmeier  1984). Defined-benefit pension  plans 
3  1. Gustman and Steinmeier (1993) find small effects of health insurance on retirement. In their 
simulations health insurance is simply a component of compensation, but this does not get at the 
issues of risk pooling, risk aversion, and prior conditions discussed earlier. 48  Michael D.  Hurd 
were often structured to encourage retirement at specific ages. In an example 
from Kotlikoff and Wise (1989) pension accrual after age 65 was  negative 
$18,000, amounting to a reduction in the wage of 21%. 
As these examples show, at one time many employers did not want to retain 
older workers whether full-time or part-time. The extent to which employers 
today have those views is not known, partly because age discrimination  is ille- 
gal, so employers are reluctant to admit to age discrimination. It is difficult 
to believe, however, that the conditions that led some employers to want to 
discriminate in the past have changed sufficiently so that today no employers 
want to discriminate. 
Generally the cause of  an employer’s wanting to terminate an employee is 
that as fully measured the product of the worker is less than the compensation 
paid to the worker. The widespread use of mandatory retirement and defined- 
benefit plans to regulate the separation of older workers has led to the conclu- 
sion that older workers as a group are overpaid, and has produced a vast litera- 
ture on why a worker’s product can differ from compensati~n.~~  The literature 
is mostly theoretical and centers on implicit contracts, the notion that the firm 
and its workers agree (implicitly) on an employment contract that covers a long 
period of employment. In this framework it can be in the best interest of both 
the firm and the worker for the firm to pay less than a worker’s product in the 
early years of employment and more in the late years. But at the age when the 
worker has been  fully paid back (total product during the work life equals 
total compensation), either employment must be  terminated or the contract 
renegotiated. If termination is chosen, the outcome can look like age discrimi- 
nation. 
The empirical support for implicit contracts as an explanation for apparent 
age discrimination is rather marginal (Straka 1992). As I discussed above, em- 
pirical studies show slowly falling real wage rates on the lifetime job at older 
ages, but possibly slowly rising total compensation. The productivity studies 
show approximately  constant productivity. However, their generality should be 
questioned: they are limited to just a few occupations, they do not control for 
sample selection, and there is general agreement that at least in  some jobs 
(physically demanding jobs) productivity falls with  age. We  do know that 
wages fall substantially with job change at older ages, which is consistent with 
the implicit contract theory, but as I have  already discussed there are other 
more straightforward  explanations. 
An  alternative explanation for apparent age discrimination is  based  on 
changes in productivity at the individual level. Older workers tend to have su- 
pervisory positions where it is both difficult to monitor their productivity and 
where a fall in productivity can be very costly to a firm. If a few supervisors 
have large declines in productivity but they cannot be identified, it may be cost 
effective for a firm to ask all workers over a certain age to retire even though 
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the productivity of most has not fallen. Regardless of the theoretical explana- 
tion, in the past many firms apparently desired to terminate the employment of 
older workers at some fixed age and used employment practices such as man- 
datory retirement before they  were made illegal. Today  when employment 
practices cannot be based on age alone, a firm could respond to an overpaid 
older workforce by reducing wages. However, for reasons centered on worker 
morale, this seems to be difficult and apparently does not happen sufficiently 
to eliminate overpayment. The firm could continually train its workforce to 
maintain or increase productivity, but because of a shortened payback period, 
this becomes infeasible at older ages. 
A firm may engage in (illegal) employment practices that are not related to 
pay  and are difficult to observe, such as unfair treatment of  older workers in 
promotions or job assignment. The objective of  the firm would be to induce 
workers to retire at ages similar to the former mandatory retirement age. Need- 
less to say, evidence about the use of such practices is sketchy at best. 
According to surveys, the opinion of managers about older workers is gener- 
ally positive. In a 1982 survey of executives of 363 companies, older workers 
were seen to be better than younger workers along a number of  dimensions 
(fiine  1984). They have lower turnover rates, they  are more conscientious, 
and they have better judgment. They were judged, however, to be less flexible 
than younger workers by a majority of the executives, which suggests they may 
be at a disadvantage  in a rapidly changing work environment. In a 1991 survey 
of 406 senior human resource managers, older workers were rated better than 
younger workers in six categories and worse in  three (Johnson and Linden 
1992).  Older workers were generally viewed favorably, and certainly at a mini- 
mum as no worse than younger workers.33  These survey responses give no rea- 
son to think that managers would use employment practices to discriminate 
systematically against older workers. 
In a widely cited study by Rosen and Jerdee (1977), however, managers said 
that they viewed older workers favorably, yet when given specific situations 
the managers made hypothetical decisions that were unfavorable to older work- 
ers. The survey was made at a time when many kinds of  age discrimination 
were not illegal, so it is certainly possible that the managers felt more free to 
reveal age discrimination than in later surveys. Of course, we have no knowl- 
edge of whether these kinds of survey answers carry over into actual business 
decisions. 
Rather small fractions of  older workers say they have been subject to age 
discrimination: only 6% of workers aged 40 or over in a 1985 survey (Secretary 
of Labor 1989).  In the new HRS,  83% of wage and salary workers aged 5 1-65 
disagreed with the statement “In decisions about promotion, my  employer 
gives younger people preference over older people.” Eighty-one percent dis- 
33. See McNaught and Henderson (1990) and Barth, McNaught, and Rizzi (1993) for additional 
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agreed with “My co-workers make older workers feel that they ought to retire 
before age 65.”34  There was little evidence of a differential response by the age 
of the worker. 
There is some evidence that the inability of  older workers to reduce hours 
is not really the problem: the main problem is that many employers do not 
want to retain older workers either full-time or part-time. This causes the tran- 
sition from full-time work to complete retirement that we  observe so often. 
The extent of age discrimination is not known because we have no direct obser- 
vations. However, management and worker surveys give the impression of only 
a modest amount. I conclude that for most older workers it is, indeed, the 
inability to reduce hours without substantial pay loss that causes the transition 
to complete retirement from full-time work. 
1.4  Conclusions 
Many rigidities facing the elderly are normal to the workplace and are faced 
by  workers of all ages. Rigidities in the choice of hours seem to be caused in 
part by  fixed costs and the requirements of team production. These lead to 
regular and long hours for the great majority of workers. Anyone who wants to 
work shorter hours or odd hours typically will have a lower wage rate because 
productivity is lower. Therefore, we  should expect that if older workers want 
to retire gradually by  decreasing hours of  work as they age, their wage rates 
will fall. 
Some occupations and industries, however, seem to have much higher fixed 
costs and less flexibility than others, and therefore they have  little part-time 
employment. Lifetime workers in those occupations and industries who want 
to reduce hours will have to change jobs. The loss of specific human capital 
and the costs of job change will reduce further the financial payoff from work, 
so many find a change is not financially acceptable and choose to retire instead. 
The implications of this analysis are observed in data, which I have interpre- 
ted as support for the theory. However, the empirical findings all incorporate 
sample selection: we observe wages and hours only of those who remain em- 
ployed. In particular, we do not observe what the wage rates would have been 
of those who retired. For example, suppose some workers retired because their 
job opportunities were even worse than those who changed jobs and remained 
in the labor force; then we  would substantially underestimate the difficulties 
of reducing hours by changing jobs. That this is plausible can be inferred from 
the difficulties that involuntarily unemployed older workers have in finding a 
new job: many leave the labor force following a spell of unemployment. This 
example illustrates a general and serious problem in understanding the labor 
market behavior of older workers: we have no individual-level data from which 
we can construct the range of options each worker faces. 
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Older workers face some rigidities that are the result of policy. The delayed 
retirement credit under Social Security is not actuarially fair; however, it is 
gradually being increased so that in a few years it should not provide any incen- 
tives to retire. The reduction for early retirement is approximately actuarially 
fair, so, to the extent that workers maximize utility over an extended time hori- 
zon, the reduction should not have any incentive effects. 
The earnings test seems to have an effect on behavior, but we do not really 
know why it does. Because of the automatic benefit recalculation, it does not 
affect the present value of the Social Security benefits of someone aged 62-64, 
so our models say it should have no effect; naturally, then, the models cannot 
explain the observed behavior. For this reason we do not know the magnitude 
of the effect: that is, how many workers would change their labor market be- 
havior were the earnings test to be eliminated. From the point of view of public 
policy the earnings test is an anachronism: because the earnings test is approxi- 
mately actuarially fair, the financial impact on government of a suspension of 
benefits for earnings is approximately zero.35  I can see no public policy reason 
for the earnings test. 
The obvious effect of  the earnings test on behavior points out an area of 
professional ignorance: many people seem to trade present consumption for 
future consumption in a way that is different from how they trade present in- 
come for future income. That is, people  will save at some rate of  interest 
through financial institutions (trade present for future consumption), yet they 
will not make the same trade in income streams. The Social Security earnings 
test is a good example. Workers can forgo income at age 62 (the income lost 
due to the earnings test) for higher income at age 65,  and the rate of exchange 
is about the same as the rate of interest adjusted for mortality. Consumption 
need not be affected if the person has assets, because spending assets can make 
the consumption paths from the two income streams the same. Therefore, if 
people would work without the earnings test, they should work with the earn- 
ings test, yet apparently a considerable number do not. This is an area for re- 
search that would be of interest to advance our knowledge of human behavior 
both in the abstract and for policy purposes. It is particularly relevant because 
of the growth in defined-contribution pension plans: they may affect retirement 
in a way similar to the earnings test. 
Defined-benefit pension plans have important incentives for some, but we 
do not know the importance in the population because of data limitations. That 
is, we  cannot find the quantitative effects in the population of pensions on 
retirement by extending our solid empirical results, which are based on indi- 
vidual firm pension plans. Furthermore, because our panel data sets have not 
35.  Because the delayed retirement credit is less than actuarially fair after age 65, eliminating 
the earnings test would cost the Social Security system money. The amount is probably small, 
however: my rough estimate based on the work patterns of  65-69-year-olds reported in Leonesio 
(1990) is that the loss is about 5% of the benefits of the group when the delayed retirement credit 
is 4%.  The revenue loss will gradually disappear as the credit becomes fair by the year 2009. 52  Michael D.  Hurd 
had detailed information on both pensions and Social Security earnings, we 
know little about how defined-benefit  pensions interact with Social Security to 
affect retirement decisions. I expect that with the availability of the HRS over 
the next decade we will learn a great deal more about the effects in the popu- 
lation. 
The rigidities induced by employer-provided health insurance are, I believe, 
large, but I have seen no research to support this view. Older research typically 
finds effects on costs of  employment that, while large in percentage terms, 
are small in absolute terms (Zedlewski 1991). Consequently, the employment 
effects of changes such as making employer-provided health insurance the pri- 
mary payer for workers aged 65-69  (Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act) 
are small (Anderson, Kennell, and Sheik 1987). This kind of research is prob- 
ably outdated because of  the sharply rising costs and the accompanying in- 
creased awareness of  health care  costs.  Similarly, eligibility for Medicare 
surely has much greater effects on retirement decisions than a decade ago: at 
one time someone would retire before age 65 and self-insure or purchase 
health care insurance until age 65. Because of the costs and risk this is becom- 
ing infeasible. 
Defined-benefit pension plans are not portable, but I believe it is unreason- 
able to make them portable as they are now structured. Consider the risk faced 
by the first employer. A former employee who has a sharply rising wage path 
with another firm will end up with a large pension. Because of the heavy back- 
loading of many plans this will not be expected by  the first firm, yet the first 
firm will have to pay a fraction of the pension.36  Furthermore, the first employer 
has no control over the earnings path of the former employee, which introduces 
an element of unfairness. 
Indexing defined-benefit plans until the age of  retirement would certainly 
reduce rigidities by removing inflation risk. This could be accomplished rather 
easily if the government issued indexed bonds. Then the employer could diver- 
sify the inflation risk by purchasing indexed bonds whose return matched the 
firm’s flow of future real pension benefits. 
I have discussed many factors that prevent labor market flexibility, but little 
evidence on their quantitative importance. This is because the complexity of 
the labor market and data limitations have restricted solid quantitative research 
that can be confidently used to infer quantitative effects. Nonetheless, I believe 
that many of the factors probably have substantial effects on a minority of 
workers and, therefore, could be changed to increase flexibility, yet in the ag- 
gregate they have rather small overall effects on hours reduction, which has 
been the main focus of this paper. I would put in this category the Social Secu- 
36. Furthermore, if the first employer has to pay only what was accrued until the time of separa- 
tion, the plan no longer has real portability: the employee with a long earnings history becomes a 
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rity earnings test and pension plans. I would also include health care insurance, 
but with much less confidence because our knowledge of  its effects on job 
mobility is scanty. 
I believe that the important factors restricting the ability of most workers to 
reduce hours are, first, fixed employment costs and production requirements 
that encourage or require full-time work and, second, the costs of  changing 
jobs late in the work life. While the costs and productivity losses associated 
with job change might be reduced, they are probably unavoidable. This leads 
to the conclusion that the best opportunity for hours reduction by older workers 
is with the career employer, not with a job change. There is an extensive litera- 
ture on how the workplace could be made more hospitable for older workers. 
It mentions factors such as continuous training, job redefinition, and so forth. 
I have no knowledge of the practicality of implementing these proposals. 
It should be apparent, however, that regardless of  any workplace changes 
there are some genuine difficulties  associated with hours reduction on the main 
job. A prominent difficulty is the provision for medical insurance. Older work- 
ers need medical insurance, yet it is a large fixed cost for employers.  A possible 
solution is to make the benefit a variable cost to the employer: that is, the 
employer would pay a fraction of the cost, which would depend on hours of 
work. The great advantage of this arrangement is that the worker could stay 
with the firm, remaining part of the risk pool; people would not be penalized 
for preexisting conditions, so risk sharing would be ex ante. The disadvantage 
comes from the fact that total costs of medical coverage remain the same, just 
the division changes. Medical insurance costs would become variable costs 
(varying with hours of work) for both employer and employee, whereas in the 
main they have been fixed costs to both. Fixed costs give an incentive to the 
firm to increase hours and an incentive to the worker to reduce hours. These 
incentives would be eliminated, but unless the wage rate rose to compensate, 
the worker would face increased costs. There are, of course, tax advantages to 
having employer-provided medical insurance, but this could be handled with 
legislation about the tax treatment of the part paid by the employee. Similar 
considerations apply to converting other fixed costs to variable costs. 
As evidenced by the lack of flextime in the United States, team production 
and the attendant requirement for full-time work appear to be major impedi- 
ments to a gradual reduction in hours on the careerjob. But the U.S. experience 
is not universal: in Germany and Switzerland  from 30 to 40% of the workforce 
is on flextime (Swart 1978; Ronen 1981).  As many as 30% of production work- 
ers in Germany may be on flextime (Young 1982). Could these practices be 
transferred to the United States? There are differences in supervisors’ and 
workers’ attitudes toward work that seem to make flextime more successful in 
Germany (Young 1982). At the same time, there are many similarities between 
German and American firms, so there seem to be no absolute barriers to in- 
creased flextime in the United States. If flextime can be accommodated in the 54  Michael D. Hurd 
Table 1.11  Weekly Hours and Probabilities of Working Past 62 or 65 among 
Those Who Cannot Reduce Hours 
Probability of  Probability of 
Working  Working 
Full-Time  Full-Time 
Percentage  Weekly Hours  after Age 62  after Age 65 
Yes (would like to)  15  42.9  0.36  0.15 
(0.5)  (.02)  (.02) 
No (would not like to)  85  41.2  0.48  0.23 
(0.1  )  (.01) 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on Health and Retirement Survey. 
Nore: Sample is 1,292 full-time wage workers. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
United States, part-time work can be accommodated, provided fixed costs can 
be controlled. 
There are few solid empirical findings that directly link rigidities to retire- 
ment beyond the suggestive data I discussed at the beginning of this paper. 
However, some new  findings based on the HRS indicate that rigidities may 
have  an  important effect in inducing retirement. Wage workers aged 5 1-61 
were asked if they  could reduce hours on their present job. Those who said 
they could not reduce were asked further if  they would like to reduce hours 
even if their earnings were reduced in the same proportion. All wage workers 
were also asked the probability they would be working full-time after age 62 
and after age 65. Table 1.11 gives the distribution of responses, weekly hours, 
and the probabilities of working after 62 or 65 among those who cannot re- 
duce hours. 
Those who would like to reduce hours, but are not allowed to on their pres- 
ent job, expect a labor force participation rate at age 62 that is about 75% of 
the participation rate of those who do not want to reduce hours, and at age 65 
a rate that is about two-thirds. The differences are statistically significant. 
The difference can be put in perspective as follows: In 1989 the participation 
rate at age 65 was 25%. Under the assumption that this rate will not change 
over time, the results in the table imply that those who desire to reduce hours 
will have a participation rate of  about 16%, or a difference in participation 
rates of 9%. This is a larger difference than the estimated effects on retirement 
of rather large changes in the Social Security system. For example, according 
to the econometric model of Gustman and Steinmeier (1983, increasing the 
delayed retirement credit from 3% to 8% (the 1983 law change) would increase 
participation at age 65 by about 4%. 
In this sample the fraction that wants to reduce hours is small (15%), but I 
would expect it to increase with age. If these results hold up when we observe 
actual retirement in the panel of HRS, they will provide convincing evidence 
on the effects of rigidities on retirement behavior. 55  The Effect of Labor Market Rigidities on Older Workers 
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Comment  Angus S.  Deaton 
It is a pleasure to read this paper; it is a thoughtful and interesting essay that 
addresses a range of issues about older workers in the labor market. As Hurd 
emphasizes, it does not attempt to make policy recommendations.  The aim is 
rather to survey the literature and to identify a research agenda for the future, 
something that is especially appropriate as we look forward to the data from 
the new Health and Retirement Survey. 
Like all good papers in economics, this one is about supply and demand. It 
looks at various aspects of labor market behavior of older workers, trying to 
identify features that are due to supply, features that are due to demand, and 
features that come from workers being forced off their supply curves, or at 
least that interfere with the smooth equation of supply and demand. As is often 
the case, identification can be controversial, and while it is sometimes easy to 
agree with Hurd’s identification of what is going on, his discussion is a good 
deal more convincing on some points than on others. This is nowhere more so 
than when we are discussing rationing, or quantity restrictions. Literature from 
a decade or so ago, associated particularly  with papers by Orley Ashenfelter 
and John Ham, tried to detect cases where workers were forced off their labor 
supply curves, and forced to accept wage and hours combinations where, given 
a free choice, they  would have either increased or decreased hours at their 
current wage. While that literature is technically quite sophisticated, working 
out all the consequences of quantity rationing,  it was perhaps not ultimately 
persuasive. Partly, the economics profession likes to believe in markets, and is 
resistant to interpretations  in which markets do not work properly, but it was 
also the case that models of rationing, while offering good explanations of the 
spillover effects from one market to another, did not by themselves offer a 
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better explanation of hours than that offered by  the standard model of labor 
supply. While it is true that many-perhaps  even most-workers  report that 
they work fifty forty-hour weeks each year, there is still a great deal of variation 
in weeks and hours, variation that is difficult to explain unless a large fraction 
of workers are free to choose how much they work. There are presumably also 
a lot of workers who want to work fifty forty-hour weeks, so that it was (and 
is) far from clear that the labor supply story is beaten out by  one in which 
employers determine hours, and workers take what they can get. As always, it 
is remarkably difficult to identify a demand-side phenomenon that could not 
be a supply-side phenomenon, and vice versa. This paper suffers from at least 
some of these problems of the earlier literature. 
Before I turn to specific areas of agreement and disagreement, I should like 
to make two general points about the interpretation  of the evidence.  First, when 
we look at how wage patterns, participation rates, and hours vary with age, 
especially among older workers, it is important to make sure that cohort effects 
are properly controlled for. At several points in the paper, evidence is cited- 
for example, on  the mild decline in wages  among older workers-that  is 
clearly cross-section evidence, where we have no way of knowing whether the 
decline comes from a real decline in wages with age, or whether what we are 
seeing is that older workers have  lower lifetime wage profiles. The second 
point is that wage profiles should not be too readily associated with life-cycle 
variations in productivity.  We know from the various theories of wage contracts 
that firms may tailor income profiles so as to match workers’ desired consump- 
tion profiles, or there may be incentive reasons to have systematic differences 
between wages and productivity. Even in academia, where, contrary to what 
happens in most industries, there is a genuine negative return to years of ser- 
vice, common experience suggests that older workers-senior  tenured profes- 
sors-are  paid a great deal more than their marginal product, while junior 
workers-junior  assistant professors-are  paid a great deal less. One can think 
of many reasons for this, and it might not even be true, but it is certainly hard 
to rule out the possibility that wages and productivity follow different life- 
time profiles. 
Suppose, however, that we accept the evidence. To what extent can we ac- 
cept Hurd’s interpretation of it, that older workers face a number of rigidities 
that importantly constrain their choice of jobs? Let me start with some parts of 
the story that I find less than convincing. The first is the assumption that what 
workers would like as they grow older is to reduce their hours gradually, so 
that when we  see people switching from full-time to no-time, we are seeing 
something that comes from the demand side. While this story is certainly pos- 
sible, I can also think of  lots of reasons, particularly health-related, why a 
major change in hours could come from the supply side. Many people like to 
work as long as they can, continuing the work and living habits of a lifetime 
until some event, usually a health-related event, leaves them either unable or 60  Michael D. Hurd 
unwilling to continue as before. In this situation, we would observe immediate 
withdrawals from the labor force that have  nothing to do with the demand 
for workers. 
The second story that I am less than convinced by is the teamwork explana- 
tion. While it is true that it is hard to run  an assembly line without all the 
workers in place, the workers don’t have to be the same workers all the time, 
and  substitution of  one person for another can allow as much  flextime as 
people want. One example is supermarket checkouts, which have to be manned 
when the store is open, but where workers are close to perfect substitutes and 
where part-time and flextime is common. In cases where there is more human 
capital, and job-specific human capital, people are likely to be less easily sub- 
stitutable for one another, and it would be interesting to inquire as to whether 
retirement patterns can be linked to relevant observable characteristics of the 
job. Even in those cases where teamwork is important, it is hard to be sure that 
the phenomenon is only on the demand side. Many people like to spend their 
leisure time with their spouse, or to play team sports, or to go to the theater, 
and all these activities are timed to make it easy for people who work stan- 
dard hours. 
It is much easier to agree with Hurd’s analysis of the role played by  fixed 
costs, and with the difficulties that they present for those who do not wish to 
work full-time. Indeed, I have come to think that work-related costs are im- 
portant for a number of issues in the economics of aging. In recent work on 
the Family Expenditure Survey in Britain, Richard Blundell and his coworkers 
have shown that much of the sharp drop in consumption at the time of retire- 
ment is associated with the elimination of  work-related costs. In the United 
States, the Consumer Expenditure Survey data on the consumption patterns of 
one- and two-earner families also suggest that a large share of consumption is 
associated with these costs, in clothing, in transportation, and in meals away 
from home. 
My final point is in the nature of a quibble, but it ties in with an issue that 
arises in a number of the papers in this volume. In examining the effects of the 
Social Security benefits test, Hurd finds that people do not behave as they 
ought to, given that the benefits test is essentially forced saving. He points out 
that, since the test does not change the net present value of lifetime earnings, 
life-cycle theory predicts there should be no change in behavior. But of course, 
this is only life-cycle theory for agents with quadratic, certainty-equivalence 
preferences. When there is uncertainty, and when there are precautionary mo- 
tives in saving, money today is worth more than an actuarially fair amount 
tomorrow, which is in the direction of the results that are reported. Of course, 
one may also suspect that there is something else going on, perhaps behavioral 
considerations, or more simply, as Hurd himself suggests, that people do not 
understand how the test works. 